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WAR AND REVOLUTION  were once the settings in which extreme inflation 
might  occur: France  in the period  of the assignats; Europe  in the 1920s; 
Greece, Hungary,  and China  in the aftermath  of World  War  II.  I In the 
1980s, the inflation net is  cast wider. Israel had its  high inflation 
experience in the early 1980s. Eastern Europe, in its transition  to a 
market  economy, is currently  having  its share:  Poland  and Yugoslavia 
have already  had  double-digit  monthly  inflation;  Bulgaria  and  the Soviet 
Union may be next. In Latin America  high inflation  is the rule: Bolivia 
in 1984-85;  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Peru  are now experiencing  wild price 
instability.  In many  of these cases, the fiscal  consequences of a political 
transition,  a terms of trade shock, or a debt crisis can be offered as the 
initiating  disturbances. 
Well over a thousand papers have been written about extreme 
inflation, including early analyses by Costantino Bresciani-Turroni, 
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1. See Seligman  (1921)  for the experience  prior  to the First  World  War;  Cagan  (1956), 
Yeager(1981),  Young  (1925),  Sargent  (1982),  Dornbusch  and  Fischer(1986),  and  Harberger 
(1978,  1988)  for later  experiences. 
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Frank  Graham,  and  Phillip  Cagan.2  Furthermore,  interest  grows  as more 
is learned  about the systematic  patterns  of high inflation,  especially for 
countries  where  inflation  is both  chronic  and  extreme,  though  lower  than 
the extravagant  levels studied  by Cagan.  The formalization  of concepts 
such as credibility  and reputation  has also increased interest in high 
inflation  experiences  by providing  cleaner  analytical  models.3  The polit- 
ical economy literature,  too, has contributed  to the debate  by explaining 
how hyperinflations  start up, why their termination  is so difficult,  and 
what  ultimately  stops them. 
This paper  examines  these issues and  addresses  two questions:  What 
do we know about the process of high inflation-its  sources, catalysts, 
and explosive behavior?  What  useful prescriptions  are there  for stabili- 
zation? 
Extreme Inflation 
High  inflation  means  different  things  to different  people. In Germany, 
it means 3 percent  or more per year; in Mexico, 20 percent  per year; in 
Brazil, 15 percent per month; and in Argentina, 6 percent per week. 
While  Cagan  defined  hyperinflation  as an inflation  rate of 50 percent  per 
month,  or 12,875  percent  per year, our  threshold  is a more  modest 1,000 
percent per year.4  In particular,  we take extreme inflation  to be rates 
above 15  to 20 percent  per month, sustained  for several  months. 
In either 1988  or 1989,  35 countries  experienced  annual  inflation  rates 
exceeding 20 percent.  Of these countries,  9 experienced  annual  inflation 
above 100 percent, and only 5 had annual inflation  rates above 1,000 
percent.5  Clearly,  extreme  inflation  is not a common  occurrence.  A first 
task, therefore,  is to isolate  those factors  that  explain  why most  countries 
do not cross the threshold  to extreme  inflation. 
Stabilizing  Factors 
A major  shock to the budget,  the terms  of trade,  or the exchange  rate 
is an essential ingredient  for high inflation.  An event such as a political 
2. Bresciani-Turroni  (1937);  Graham  (1930);  Cagan  (1956). 
3. See, for example,  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983),  Bruno  (1990),  and  Kiguel  and  Liviatan 
(1990b). 
4.  Cagan  (1956). 
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disturbance-in its most extreme  form, war-or  an abrupt  international 
credit  rationing  may  trigger  the inflation.  Countries  that  do not  experience 
such a shock are unlikely  candidates  for an extreme  inflation. 
Even among  those countries  that  experience  a shock, the propagation 
of a price spiral may be dampened if proper action is taken. First, 
policymakers  may offset the shock by corrective monetary and fiscal 
policies, rather  than remain  passive or accommodate  the disturbance. 
Although  such policies may slow growth,  even to the point  of recession, 
they surely  stand  in  the  way of accelerating  inflation.  Second, institutions 
may also enact stabilizing policies. Specifically, the disallowance of 
wage indexation  can help avoid an inflationary  spiral. 
As for fiscal shocks, it is a long road from a budget deficit to a 
hyperinflation.  A shock to a budget that is financed by domestic or 
external debt will not be inflationary,  at least not in the short run. By 
contrast,  if most of the deficit  is financed  by money creation  rather  than 
debt, inflation is more likely. In a country already demonetized by 
chronic inflation,  extreme inflation  becomes even more likely. In that 
case, a given deficit  represents  a large  share  of the existing  money stock, 
and  deficit  finance  thus becomes highly  inflationary. 
Highly  unique  conditions  lead to extreme  inflation.  In addition  to the 
shocks, a country  must  already  be in a weakened state, and the process 
must be allowed to run its course unchecked  for quite a while if it is to 
lead ultimately to extreme inflation. In several cases,  the runaway 
process was decisively interrupted  before control was lost. In France 
and  Italy, in  the period  1945-48,  the price  level tripled  before  stabilization 
put a stop to accelerating  inflation.  In Chile, in 1975-78,  the price level 
increased  eight-fold  (nine-fold  in Mexico between 1984-89)  before sta- 
bilization  occurred. In the experiences we study below, however, the 
deterioration  was allowed to proceed much  further,  making  hyperinfla- 
tion a reality. 
The Starting Point 
Consider  next how a high inflation  process gets underway  in three 
alternative  environments.  First, a country  with  chronically  high  inflation 
experiences a shock that leads to a sharp,  possibly explosive, increase 
in prices. Brazil, Argentina,  and Israel are examples given in table 1. 
The chronic  presence of high inflation  implies  that  these economies will 
have adapted to inflation-indexation may be common in labor and 4  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 1.  Annual Rates of Inflation in Selected High Inflation Countries, 1975-90 
Percent 
Most  recent 
Country  1975-80  1980-85  1986-89  12 monthsa 
Argentina  193  323  588  14,030 
Bolivia  17  611  15  15 
Brazil  51  149  610  6,407 
Israel  61  195  19  20 
Mexico  21  61  81  27 
Nicaragua  19  54  3,130  10,531 
Peru  50  102  693  2,864 
Poland  7  32  90  994 
Yugoslavia  18  47  343  1,876 
Source:  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics,  1990 Yearbook  and October  1990 editions,  except  1989 data for 
Nicaragua,  which was provided by the Nicaraguan authorities. 
a.  The average inflation rate over the most recent twelve  months for which data are available for each country  is 
shown. 
financial  markets. But this same indexation  may prevent the economy 
from effectively absorbing  shocks to relative prices and may leave the 
economy prone  to hyperinflation.  When  indexing  adjustments  are infre- 
quent, there  is a long lag between shocks and  their  impact  on wages. By 
contrast, when indexation occurs monthly or more frequently, the 
automatic  feedback  of disturbances  to wages and  prices, and  back  to the 
exchange rate, amounts  to a rapid, vicious cycle of rising prices. The 
financial  adaptation  already in place-the  easy availability  of interest- 
bearing  assets-facilitates  the flight  from  money. 
The second possible scenario arises when a country with moderate 
inflation suffers a rapid, uncontrolled  explosion in inflation  due to a 
shock to the budget or the external balance. In table 1, Mexico could 
provide  an  example.  In  this situation,  an  outburst  of inflation  will surprise 
money-holders  and may find the authorities  unprepared  for the rapid 
adjustments  that  the private  sector makes. 
Finally, an extreme inflation  can occur in a country  where inflation 
has been repressed and where deficit finance has built up a monetary 
"overhang."  In this case, there  is not only the ordinary  flow problem  of 
a budget  deficit  financed  by money creation  but also a stock problem  in 
that the money supply  is already  too high relative  to nominal  income at 
controlled  prices. Once prices are freed up, inflation  gets rapidly  under- 
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very quickly.  The fear of this type of explosive inflation  led to pervasive 
monetary  reform  in Germany  and elsewhere in the 1940s.6 Poland, in 
1989, is a more recent example. The Soviet Union and Bulgaria  may 
provide  the next examples. 
A  country's starting point is  important  because it bears on the 
dynamics  of high  inflation.  Countries  with chronic  inflation  tend to have 
a financial  structure  that  is adapted  to inflation;  capital  flight,  the  resulting 
exchange rate collapse, and the consequent explosive inflation  may be 
stretched out over time. By  contrast, in countries that have little 
experience  with  high  inflation,  primitive  financial  structures,  and  entirely 
unindexed  fiscal institutions,  an inflationary  shock can set the house on 
fire  in  no time. Because  the  financial  structure  is so unadapted  to inflation, 
there  will typically  be an initial  phase in which real  balances  rise rapidly 
as a result of deficit finance. If no interest-bearing  assets are available 
and  dollar-holding  is uncommon,  little  adjustment  to real  balances  takes 
place initially.  Later,  as escalating  inflation  becomes apparent,  the flight 
from  money into foreign  assets accelerates  dramatically. 
Are All Hyperinflations Alike? 
High inflation  experiences have many common, systematic  features 
including  demonetization,  growing  deficits,  and  accelerating  frequencies 
of wage and price adjustment. High inflations also differ from one 
another.  For example, the great  inflations  of the 1920s  were considered 
extreme aberrations,  which could be remedied  by a return  to the gold 
standard.  By contrast, the current inflation  in some Latin American 
countries  remains  endemic, and  has no certain  cure. 
The recent  Latin  American  experience  differs  from  those of the 1920s 
in three ways. First, the inflations  in Latin America, and also in Israel 
prior  to the 1985  stabilization,  have lasted longer. They have extended 
over  a decade  or  more  through  the  intermittent  but  persistent  acceleration 
of inflation.  Second, current  inflation  rates remain  far below those of, 
for example, Germany in the second half of  1923, where inflation 
averaged  4,551 percent  per month.  Third,  in recent  times there  has been 
a stop-go  pattern  of inflation-temporary stabilizations  are followed by 
major  blowups. The temporary  stabilizations  initially  seem to prevent 
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the dramatic  escalation  into hyperinflation,  but  the successive rounds  of 
stop-go policies raise the average  monthly  inflation  rates and may only 
delay the escalation.7  The stop-go pattern  of Latin American  inflation, 
as we shall  see below, has important  implications  for stabilization. 
Traditional Approaches 
A stark monetary view of extreme inflation  is offered in Cagan's 
classic model.8 In his theory, inflation is determined in the money 
market,  and  its pace is set by the growth  rate  of money  and  the evolution 
of inflationary  expectations,  which  are  the sole determinants  of velocity. 
In the absence of other  financial  assets, expected inflation  measures  the 
alternative  cost of holding  money. Inflationary  expectations  are formed 
adaptively,  and the nominal  money supply  grows at an exogenous rate. 
Other real variables, particularly  output, that may affect real money 
demand  are considered invariant.  Inflation  is determined  by monetary 
equilibrium  alone;  the goods and  labor  markets  play no role. Finally,  the 
economy is closed. With  these assumptions,  the model  takes the form, 
(1)  MIP = L(Tr*), 
(2)  ik  =  oa(w  -  w*), 
where w and w* denote actual and expected inflation.  Differentiating 
equation 1 with respect to time, and letting 1i denote the percentage 
growth  rate  of the nominal  money supply  and I denote  the semielasticity 
of real  money demand,  we obtain 
(3)  'a =  (1L -  0c4T*)/(l  -  43),  where 1  > a-P. 
The model predicts  that if the rate of money growth  is increased  and 
sustained  at its new level, the rate of inflation  jumps above the rate of 
money growth  and then gradually  falls until it equals the rate of money 
growth. We illustrate  this point in figure 1. In the adjustment  process, 
real balances  decline accordingly.  Expected inflation  gradually  rises as 
expectations are revised upward  until the gap between actual inflation 
and  prevailing  expectations  is closed. 
Arguments  surrounding  Cagan's  basic model  have broadly  addressed 
7. Canavese  and  Di Tella  (1988)  and  Heyman  (1990). 
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Figure 1.  Adjustment to a Sustained Increase in Money Growth 
Inflation 
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three  issues: the expectations  mechanism,  the assumptions  about  money 
growth, and the assumptions  about the determinants  of inflation.  Criti- 
cism of the expectations  mechanism,  notably  the rational  expectations 
attack, has focused on the serial correlation  of forecast errors in the 
adjustment  process. An  alternative  model  would  emphasize  fully  rational 
expectations.9  When  perfect  foresight  is assumed, two differences  with 
the previous analysis emerge. First, the price level is allowed to jump. 
Second, actual  and  anticipated  inflation  are equal, r =  r*. 
In this forward-looking  model of inflation,  an increase in the growth 
rate of nominal  money immediately  raises both the price level and the 
rate of inflation. Thus, real balances instantly decline to the level 
appropriate  to the higher  growth  rate  of nominal  money and  prices. Full 
adjustment  to an increase in money growth occurs immediately;  there 
are  no protracted  dynamics.  Anticipated,  future  money  growth  still  leads 
9.  Sidrauski  (1967),  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1973a),  Black  (1974),  Sargent  (1977),  Salemi 
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to ajump  in the current  price  level, but  now inflation  rises gradually  until 
money  growth  increases. 
A New  Approach 
We depart  from  the Cagan  model and  the related  literature  in several 
ways. Although  the rational  expectations formulation  is theoretically 
attractive,  it does not reflect  the facts. Increased  money  growth  initially 
tends to raise real balances; only later does inflation build up and 
overshoot for a while.  10  Figure  2 shows the example  of Peru  after 1985. 
In our model, we emphasize  that prices are set rather  than determined 
by an invisible, money market-clearing  hand.  The price setting,  in turn, 
is dependent  on the prevailing  inflationary  regime. 
A second difference in our model concerns financial  markets. The 
assumption  that money is the only asset is patently misleading.  Some 
countries do have domestic financial  markets. When they do not, the 
dollar usually plays a conspicuous role as an alternative  asset. The 
availability  of alternative  assets influences  the dynamics  of inflation. 
The third difference in our model concerns the process of money 
growth,  and  the motivation  a government  may have to create or accom- 
modate  inflation.  As a theory  of inflationary  finance,  the Cagan-Chicago 
tradition  has emphasized that governments  use inflation  as a rational 
means of raising  revenue for deficit finance. This approach  has led to 
models of optimal  inflation,  which balance  revenue considerations  and 
various constraints  or costs associated with inflationary  finance.1'  In 
their simplest  form, such models predict  that a government  maximizes 
seigniorage  by choosing the rate of inflation  at which the elasticity of 
real  money demand  with respect  to anticipated  inflation  equals  unity, or 
the peak of the Laffer  curve. 
Martin  Bailey has questioned  the use of the seigniorage  approach  as 
a positive  theory  of extreme  inflation.  12 Because  taxation  is an  alternative 
to money  creation  and  because the marginal  cost of taxation  is moderate 
relative to the welfare costs of extreme inflation,  high money growth 
(and therefore high inflation)  strategies are not optimal. In our view, 
10. Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1982)  set out this pattern. 
11. See Cagan  (1956),  Bailey  (1956),  Friedman  (1971),  Barro  (1972a,  1983),  and  Bruno 
(1990). 
12. Bailey  (1956). Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  9 
Figure 2.  Peru: Real Money,  1985990a 
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Source:  Authors'  own calculations  using Central Bank of Peru,  Weekly Bulletin,  various issues. 
a.  Real money  is the nominal money  supply in the local currency divided by the CPI (1989  =  100). 
extreme inflation reflects a state of fiscal chaos, not optimal public 
finance. 
Neither  money  nor  the budget  is exogenous  in a high  inflation  process. 
We show that higher  inflation  leads to larger  deficits  and greater  money 
creation unless governments actively intervene to change the fiscal 
structure.  Moreover,  even if they do act, the pace at which inflation  can 
destroy the fiscal system may well outrun  the government's  attempt  to 
reform  the system. 
This observation  leads to a fourth  difference  in our model. We view 
high  inflation  as intrinsically  unstable.  Shocks  to high  inflation  economies 
easily translate  into explosive inflation  until  a fundamental  stabilization 
program  can reset the dials. If correct, this view raises the question of 
why a government  would allow explosive inflation  to occur rather  than 
stabilize early. Answers to this question must come from a political 10  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
economy approach that analyzes the difficulty in bringing about a 
balanced  budget  and illustrates  how extreme inflation  is a negative sum 
game. With  the seigniorage  approach  one would expect stable, steady- 
state inflation.  The political  economy approach,  however, may explain 
why inflation  explodes, only to be stabilized later, and why rational 
governments  make U-turns  in economic policy.  13 
In conclusion,  the view that  inflation  is about  too much  money  chasing 
too few goods is not totally wrong, but it fails to give a useful idea of 
what  in fact happens.  First,  the influence  of inflation  on the budget  deficit 
is a critical element in the inflation. Second, the inflation  process is 
significantly  affected by the adaptation  of financial institutions. The 
emergence  of new financial  products  such as overnight,  interest-bearing 
deposits  affects  the  government's  ability  to collect seigniorage  and  hence 
shapes the inflation  process. Third,  the inflation  process is driven  in part 
by the pricing  rules  of economic agents  in the goods and  factor  markets. 
A shortening  of adjustment  intervals  becomes a factor  in inflation  that  is 
independent  of aggregate  demand. Finally, as we discuss below, the 
external sector can play a critical  role in the inflation  process because 
real  exchange rates are not constant. Indeed, the assumption  of pur- 
chasing  power parity  is empirically  unwarranted.  As a result, shocks to 
the real  exchange  rate  can precipitate  high  inflation. 
Inflation, Money Growth, and the Budget 
In this section  we discuss the links  between  the  growth  rate  of nominal 
money, the budget  deficit, and the rate of inflation.  We emphasize  two 
factors. First, money growth  is endogenous;  money passively finances 
budget  deficits. Second, the real  budget  deficit  is not exogenous because 
inflation  affects the real  level of revenues. 
The inflationary  equilibrium  is described by monetary equilibrium 
and  the link  between money creation  and the budget  deficit:  14 
(4)  MIP  =  OY, 
13. For explorations  in this direction, see Alesina and Drazen (1990), Cukierman, 
Edwards,  and Tabellini  (1989), Orphanides  (1990);  and, in another  context, Fernandez 
and  Rodrik  (1990). 
14. We note that  the budget  deficit  includes  the "quasi-fiscal"  deficit  that  arises  from 
the credit and foreign  exchange operations  of the central  bank. Also, money issued by 
state and  local governments,  by corporations,  and  even by private  entrepreneurs  is often 
significant.  The seigniorage shared by the banking system and other money issues 
necessarily  increases  the inflation  rate  associated  with  any given budget  deficit. Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  11 
where  0 is the budget  deficit  as a share  of real  GDP, Y.  Suppose  now that 
velocity is a linear  function  of inflation,  V = cx  + 131r.  Imposing  monetary 
equilibrium  and the steady-state  condition  that velocity be constant  (so 
that inflation  equals nominal  money growth), we obtain an expression 
for steady-state  inflation: 
(5)  rr  =  cX0/(1 -  (0). 
It is apparent  from the functional  form that inflation  is an increasing, 
nonlinear  function  of the budget  deficit.  15 
The interaction  between the budget  and prices-both  their  level and 
their  rate  of change-may  go in one of two directions.  Either  fiscal drag 
and the reduction of the real value of debts dominate, in which case 
inflation reduces deficits. Or, inflation worsens deficits because of 
collection lags that reduce real revenues. During  the hyperinflation  of 
the 1920s,  it was generally  acknowledged  that inflation  reduced  the real 
revenue of governments and that, by implication, deficits would be 
smaller  if inflation  could be reduced.  16 The adverse response of deficits 
to inflation  is now known  as the Tanzi  effect.  17 
We identify  five channels  through  which inflation  affects the deficit. 
-Lags  in collection in a less than  fully indexed  tax system lead to the 
erosion of real revenues, not only automatically, but also from the 
additional  erosion that  results  from  manipulated  delays in payment. 
-Tax  compliance deteriorates,  and so the tax yield of a given tax 
structure  declines. This effect is a by-product  of inflation  and public 
demoralization;  it is not a mechanical  effect. 
-The  real value of payments on long-term  debt, fixed in nominal 
terms, declines. This mechanism was important  in the 1920s but is 
marginal  in the experiences  of the 1980s. 
-With  increased inflation  and unchanged  indexation intervals for 
wages, the average real public sector wage between adjustment  dates 
declines. 
-Nominal  interest payments on short-term  domestic debt come to 
15. An alternative  specification  is the Cagan  form  which yields 0 = w-reX,.  Because 
the  right-hand  side  has the Laffer  curve  property,  there  are  two equilibria  unless  the deficit 
is too large  to be financed  by money  creation  at constant  inflation.  See Evans  and  Yarrow 
(1981),  Cardoso  (forthcoming),  Kiguel  (1989),  and  especially  Bruno  and  Fischer  (1990)  on 
the implications  of the Laffer  curve. 
16. See Bresciani-Turroni  (1937),  Graham  (1930),  and  League  of Nations  (1946). 
17. See Olivera  (1967),  Dutton  (1971),  and  Tanzi  (1977, 1978). 12  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
include  an  inflation  premium,  giving  rise  to the distinction  between  actual 
and  inflation-adjusted  debt service. 
The effects of inflation  on the budget  are difficult  to establish  empiri- 
cally because they are obscured by other effects: the interaction of 
automatic  effects like inflationary  erosion;  the shortening  of adjustment 
lags; and the introduction  of changes in the tax rate, the tax base, and 
tax administration.  Therefore,  we must  look at individual  cases in order 
to show that a decline in revenue is a striking  fact of high inflation  and 
that  while real spending  also falls, the decline is not commensurate. 
For example, consider  the German  hyperinflation.  If the real  value of 
tax revenue is taken as 100  in 1921,  it declines to 45 by 1922. Over the 
same period, the real value of the public debt was basically wiped out, 
though  the net effect was still a dramatic  widening  of the deficit.  18 Table 
2 shows the example  of Peru  in the 1980s. 
In the hyperinflations  of the  1980s, the public enterprise sector 
systematically  contributed  to the enlargement  of deficits. The lack of 
full indexation  of public  sector prices, such as for energy, transport,  and 
telephones, had been welcomed and used pervasively  by policymakers 
because it slowed inflation;  yet, the public sector deficit widened as a 
result. While it is intended  to maintain  the living standards  of the poor, 
the policy's true  effects have often been random  and  sometimes  outright 
regressive. 
The link running  from inflation  to the budget, and hence to money 
creation,  affects inflation  dynamics.  The deficit, measured  as a share  of 
GDP, becomes a function  of the inflation  history and of any responses 
to inflation  such as indexation,  the shortening  of tax collection lags, or 
changes  in the tax structure. 
In this scenario, the vulnerability  of the real deficit depends on the 
relative strength  of tax indexation  and collection lags, for some given 
distribution  of outlays and revenue. We would expect that, in the face 
of rising  real deficits, efforts will be made to increase the real tax yield 
by shortening  lags and increasing  the degree  of tax indexation.  A simple 
model conveys the effects. Inflation  proceeds at the constant rate, ir, 
and nominal  income is taxed at a constant rate, v. The fraction  of past 
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Table  2. Peru:  Public  Finance  Data, Expressed  as Percent  of GDP, 1985-89 
Percent 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Tax collection  13  11  9  7  4 
Public  enterprise  revenue  26  18  14  12  10 
Budget  deficit  6  10  12  14  11 
Source:  Unpublished  World Bank data. 
tax revenue collected today decays exponentially  with a mean  lag of a. 
In that  case, the deficit  ratio  is 
(6)  0  = g  -  v/(1 +  C T), 
where g denotes real government  spending  as a fraction  of GDP, and a 
can assume a value between zero and infinity  (the closer to zero, the 
more current  the collection). Equation  6 shows that the more current 
the tax collection, the higher  is the real revenue. It also shows that the 
higher  the  rate  of inflation,  the lower  the  real  yield  of a given  tax structure. 
For a given collection lag, an extreme increase in the rate of inflation 
will basically  wipe out revenue. 
Given the velocity equation  and the noninflationary  deficit (g -  v), 
the longer  the average  lag in tax collection, the higher  is the steady-state 
rate  of inflation.  Moreover,  given  the nonlinearities,  even small  increases 
in the deficit  can produce  large  changes  in inflation.  19 
Equation  6 focuses on the case of a constant-inflation  history. Yet, 
when inflation  has been rising, the current  real value of tax collection 
will depend on the history of inflation  acceleration. The sharper  the 
acceleration  becomes, relative to the lag in tax collection, the further 
real  revenue  falls compared  to the constant-inflation-rate  formula.  In the 
simulations  below, this complication  emerges as a critical  destabilizing 
element. 
To summarize,  the endogeneity  of the money stock is an important 
feature  of hyperinflation.  In economies  where  money  creation  is the only 
means of deficit finance, the budget deficit becomes a principal  deter- 
minant of money growth. In addition, faster money growth leads to 
19. It is apparent  from  the nonlinearities  in equations  2 and  3 that  equilibrium  need  not 
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higher  inflation  which, in turn,  determines  the deficit.  The interaction  is 
highly nonlinear,  which helps explain the sharp  escalation of inflation 
that can occur once a certain  threshold  is crossed. A simulation  model 
presented  below displays that characteristic  in a setting where pricing 
decisions  and  the  velocity response  to inflation  are  optimized.  It  becomes 
evident  that  extreme  inflation  emerges  in those cases where the govern- 
ment  has lost control  over money growth  because the deficit  is financed 
automatically.  To make things worse, the deficit itself responds posi- 
tively to the rate  of inflation. 
Pricing 
The interaction  between inflation  and the frequency  of price adjust- 
ment represents the second building  block of inflationary  dynamics. 
Economic agents incur costs in adjusting  prices. Thus, the optimal 
frequency  for adjusting  prices depends on these "menu  costs" and the 
trend  rate  of inflation.  The  frequency  of adjustment  becomes  endogenous 
in a high inflation economy, with the shortening of the adjustment 
interval  accelerating  inflation  which, in  turn,  leads  to a further  shortening 
of adjustment  intervals.  Without  monetary  accommodation  this process 
could not go far. But, as already  noted, money growth is endogenous 
through budget deficit finance. Thus, the shortening of adjustment 
intervals becomes another endogenous driving force in the inflation 
process. 
Strategic  interaction  among price setters is an important  feature of 
the growing  literature  on optimal  price adjustment  in stochastic infla- 
tionary  economies.20  We are interested  in the fact that the frequency  of 
adjustment  accelerates  with inflation.  We also want  to learn  more  about 
the thresholds  of inflation  at which the shortening  of pricing  intervals 
occurs. 
The Firm and the Industry 
Individual  firms face the microeconomic  decision of how often to 
change prices. Consider  a loss function  for an individual  firm  in which 
20.  See Barro (1972b), Mussa (1981a), Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1983), 
Cecchetti (1986), Benabou (1988), and Diamond (1990) for models of optimal pricing rules. Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  15 
the fixed  cost of price  adjustment  is denoted  by c. In addition,  the firm's 
profit depends on the relative price of its product  with respect to the 
entire economy, which we proxy by taking the square of the rate of 
inflation  divided  by the frequency  of adjustment,  n; 
(7)  Z =  cn +  A(ITln)2. 
The firm  selects the optimal  adjustment  frequency,  n*: 
(8)  n* =  (24yrr2/C)113. 
Thus, the firm adjusts prices more frequently the higher the rate of 
inflation.21 
Across industries,  the frequency  increases  as the fixed  cost of adjust- 
ment decreases and misaligned relative prices become more costly. 
Equation 8 indicates a continuous relation between inflation  and the 
frequency of price adjustments.  In fact, the importance  of inflation  is 
probably  noticeable only when inflation  becomes considerable.  Then, 
shifts  from say annual  to quarterly,  monthly  or even weekly adjustment 
can be expected. 
Note  that we  might also interpret the shortening of  adjustment 
intervals as a response to increased uncertainty.  If high inflation  also 
means  more  variable  inflation  over a specified  horizon,  firms  may  adjust 
to the increased uncertainty  by shortening  their pricing horizon.22  If 
inflation  uncertainty  is proportional  to the level of inflation,  a longer 
pricing  interval  implies  increased  uncertainty  of relative  prices. Accord- 
ingly,  the term  'rr/n  may  reflect  uncertainty  about  the firm's  relative  price. 
When inflation  becomes extreme, price setting occurs in dollars so 
that prices in the local currency are fully flexible. The shift to dollar 
pricing  occurs when the value of the dollar  becomes a better indicator 
of the current  domestic price level than information  contained  in past 
rates  of inflation. 
21. The analysis is easily adapted  to an industry  setting  by modifying  the objective 
function  to  be Z  =  cn  +  [(*Trln)2  +  v*r(n'In)2],  where  n'  is  the industry  adjustment 
frequency  observed  by the individual  firm.  Solving  for the firm's  optimum  and imposing 
n*  =  n' yields the symmetric  industry  equilibrium  where now the cost parameter,  v, 
influences  the equilibrium  frequency. 
22. The existence of a positive relationship  between the level and the variability  of 
inflation  has  been  extensively  documented.  See, for  example,  Mitchell  (1927),  Mills  (1927), 
and  Fischer  (1981).  Of  course,  variability  does not  imply  uncertainty.  For  present  purposes, 
however,  we are happy  to make  this  further  leap  of faith. 16  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1990 
Relative  Prices 
When  aggregate  inflation  is moderate,  firm  and  industry  prices  change 
infrequently,  perhaps  once a year.  With  higher  inflation,  price  adjustment 
may be semiannual,  quarterly, or ultimately monthly, weekly, even 
daily. In the limit, indexation  to the dollar  becomes the only way a firm 
can judge its relative price position given the prohibitive costs  of 
ascertaining  the current  price level. Because the pricing  by firms and 
industries  translates  into an aggregate  rate  of inflation,  their  prices have 
spillover  effects: on the pricing  of labor,  including  official  minimum  wage 
and public sector wage setting; on the adjustment  of prices for public 
services; and, importantly,  on the exchange  rate. 
Public  sector price adjustment  should  follow the same logic as firms' 
pricing  decisions, though it rarely does. The data in table 2 give a fair 
idea of the fiscal effects of misaligned  relative prices in an extreme 
inflation  country, Peru. As inflation  accelerates, both tax revenue and 
public  enterprise  revenue  decline as a share  of GNP. 
It is less evident that menu costs are important  for exchange rate 
adjustments.  Therefore,  governments  might  choose to move exchange 
rates almost continuously  in order  to maintain  their  real value. Indeed, 
several countries,  for example Brazil  in the 1970s,  have done  just that. 
But, as with public sector prices, exchange rates are a  seemingly 
attractive  means  of dampening  inflation  in the short  run,  and so they are 
abused  for that end. 
Evidence  on Pricing 
The general  pattern  of price  adjustment  is shown  below. We note that 
with increasing  inflation  all price setting speeds up and slower-moving 
prices  would  catch up. 
Speed of adjustment 
Frequent  Intermediate  Slow 
Exchange  rate  Public  prices  Wages 
WPI  CPI 
The increasing  synchronization  that emerges during  a shift to high 
inflation  can be seen from the cross correlations  of exchange rates and 
prices.  In  countries  with  histories  of persistent  inflation,  the link  between Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  17 
Table 3.  Correlation between Prices and the Current Exchange Rate, 
Selected Inflationary Episodes 
Consumer  prices  Average 
Ahead two  Lagged  inflation 
Country  and time  period  months  Current  two months  rate (percent) 
Bolivia 
1980:1-1983:1  0.233  0.531  0.472  5.41a 
1983:2-1986:2  0.870  0.997  0.864  25.71 
Israel 
1980:1-1982:9  0.611  0.608  0.381  6.20a 
1982:10-1985:7  0.840  0.999  0.839  11.48 
Argentina 
1985:7-1989:1  0.878  0.993  0.866  10.07 
1989:  1-1989:7  0.235  0.968  0.003  49.43 
Brazil 
1960:1-1969:12  0.945  0.988  0.936  1.29 
1980:  1-1985:2  0.789  0.993  0.787  3.25 
1985:3-1990:6  0.709  0.987  0.626  16.88a 
Source: Authors'  own calculations  and International  Financial  Statistics.  The data are monthly,  and prices are 
the consumer  price  indexes  for each country. 
a. The inflation  rate  is the average  over the periods  indicated,  except where  data  were available:  the first  inflation 
figure  for Bolivia is average  from May 1980  to January  1983;  the first figure  for Israel is from October  1980  to 
September  1982;  and the last figure  for Brazil  is from  March  1985  to April  1990. 
the dollar  and  domestic  prices is well developed. An increase  in the rate 
of inflation  results in a shortening  of the adjustment  lags, mirrored  by a 
tendency for the correlations  to become centered on the contempora- 
neous value. By contrast,  in countries  without  a history  of exchange  rate 
indexation,  accelerating  inflation  leads to the development  of indexation 
mechanisms,  resulting  in a uniform  increase  in correlations  across leads 
and  lags. 
In table 3, we divide inflationary  episodes into several parts and 
present the correlations  between the current  exchange rate and both 
current  prices and prices with leads and lags. The data  broadly  support 
our hypothesis. For Brazil  and  Argentina,  it is interesting  to note that  as 
inflation  increases over time the correlation  with leads and lags falls off 
sharply. 
Inflation and Price Adjustment 
An  important  aspect  of pricing  involves  the  basis  on which  adjustments 
are made. At moderate  rates of inflation,  adjustment  will be based on 
past inflation.  As inflation  rises, the adjustment  interval  shrinks,  though 18  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
the inflation  over the immediately  preceding  period  still continues  to be 
a reasonable  predictor  of the inflation  immediately  ahead. 
Not surprisingly,  information  about inflation  becomes more widely 
known and more current as inflation rises. Countries with monthly 
inflation  rates  of 20  or 30  percent  routinely  develop  private,  if not official, 
estimates of inflation  rates on a weekly basis. But even weekly data 
obsolesce when inflation  accelerates sharply, which may explain the 
ultimate  shift to the dollar. Although  the foreign  exchange value of the 
dollar is quite unstable, it may still represent a better estimate of the 
general  price  level than  a guess based on a narrow  sample  of current  and 
previously  reported  prices. As one can imagine, several different  vari- 
ables are used when making  price adjustment.  The choice of variables 
depends on their past correlation  with the general price level. If the 
correlation  between the general  price  level and  the dollar  becomes more 
stable as inflation  increases, signal  extraction  arguments  would explain 
the increasing  shift  to the dollar  as the best predictor  of the general  price 
level. 
Some evidence of this phenomenon  comes from the German  experi- 
ence in  the 1920s.  In  regressions  of current  prices  on the  current  exchange 
rate and lagged  prices, in the early phase of German  hyperinflation,  the 
exchange rate did not carry significant  information  about the current 
price level beyond what was contained in lagged prices. After the 
breakdown  of stability  in the spring  of 1922,  however, the exchange  rate 
became an increasingly important  predictor of current prices. This 
evidence supports  the idea that exchange rates ultimately  become the 
basis of pricing. 
If wage and  retail  price setters were to shift  from  using  past inflation, 
perhaps on a monthly basis, to using the current exchange rate as a 
pricing  guide, all  lags would  disappear.  In combination  with endogenous 
money, a totally unstable price level emerges. This catchup process 
explains  the explosion in the price level and exchange rate that charac- 
terizes outright  hyperinflation. 
Labor Market 
Juan  Peron allegedly observed that when prices take the lift, wages 
cannot take the staircase.23  In the labor market,  wage adjustments  are 
23. See Cavallo  (1982).  Peron's  insight  was already  familiar  to the New York  Reform 
Club's  Sound  Currency  Committee  in the 1890s,  see Reform  Club  (1896). Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  19 
usually based on formal or informal backward-looking indexation.  This 
practice  implies  that  when  inflation  accelerates,  and  the  indexation 
interval does  not decline  nor are base  wages  raised,  the average  real 
wage declines.  Reuben Kessel  and Armen Alchian refer to this phenom- 
enon as the wage-lag hypothesis  and contest  its existence.24 At issue is 
whether the real wage does decline in periods of accelerating inflation. 
And, if so,  should the decline  be attributed to a fall in the equilibrium 
real wage of a competitive  labor market, or to features of wage setting 
that show insufficient flexibility in the face of accelerating,  and perhaps 
incompletely anticipated, inflation? 
The real minimum wage in Brazil, as shown in figure 3, provides an 
example.25 The nominal minimum wage is officially set on the basis of 
accumulated  price  increases,  and applies  to  a significant part of  the 
Brazilian labor market, including household  workers and the informal 
sector.  At  the  end  of  the  1970s, with  annual inflation rates  of 40-50 
percent,  nominal wages  were  adjusted only  once  a year.  In 1979, the 
adjustment became  semiannual (in May and November)  even  though 
the rate of inflation had risen to more than 200 percent.  By  1986, the 
frequency of minimum wage adjustments became discretionary depend- 
ing on which  stabilization  program, which  invariably included  wage- 
price controls, was in effect. From 1989 to the present, adjustments have 
been monthly or, at most,  bimonthly.  They continue  to be backward- 
looking, in that the adjustments equal the inflation that has accumulated 
since the last readjustment. 
In  every  high  inflation,  there  is  pressure  to  adjust  wages  more 
frequently and more fully. The following quote from the German expe- 
rience of 1919-24 characterizes the issues: 
There  was no lack of attempts  to make the index number  the sole determining 
factor in wage negotiations. The battle for the sliding wage scale began in 
Germany in the middle of  1919, and never really quite stopped until the 
introduction  of the system of gold wages. In the continued  struggle  to maintain 
the  level of real  wages, the workers  showed  a comprehensible  preference  for the 
system of complete  automatic adaptation of wages....  The employers  almost 
unanimously  refused the sliding scale, which they feared would lead to rapid 
and  complete  disaster,  both monetary  and  economic....26 
24. Kessel and  Alchian  (1960). 
25. The same pattern  can be shown for wages in manufacturing.  Accordingly  the 
properties  are  not  peculiar  to administered  wages. Pazos  (1972)  commented  on this seesaw 
pattern  of real  wages. 
26. Stizler  (1924,  p. 648). 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Figure 3.  Brazil: Real Minimum Wage,  1977-90 
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Source: Banco  Central  do Brasil  Boletim Mensual  and Conjuntura Economica,  various  issues. 
In the extreme  stages of the hyperinflation,  indexation  was complete. 
The only issue was whether  the index  number  of Monday's  prices, which 
was published  on Wednesday, could still be useful for wage payments 
made  later  in the week.27 
Why does the labor market  accept so much variability  in the real 
wage? Since much of the variability is anticipated, and since more 
frequent adjustments  of money wages (as opposed to more frequent 
payments) do not have a resource cost beyond checking the latest 
inflation figure, there is a puzzle. With a given frequency of wage 
adjustments,  higher  inflation  automatically  depresses  average  real  wages. 
As such, firms  might  be tempted  to resist a shortening  of the indexation 
interval.  But why should workers  not insist on higher  base wages, and 
what stops firms  from  competing  with more  effective wage plans?  While 
27. See Stizler  (1924,  p. 655). Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Federico Sturzenegger,  and Holger Wolf  21 
the indexation  interval  does eventually shrink, suggesting  some com- 
petition, it is surprisingly  resistant  when one considers the variation  in 
real wages over the cycle and the handicaps  that workers, relative to 
firms,  face in accessing  financial  markets  in order  to smooth  real  wages. 
More frequent adjustment,  or prepayment  of the next adjustment, 
resolves the labor  unrest  and the productivity  problems  that stem from 
the automatic  decline  of real  wages under  a fixed  payment  pattern.  Once 
again,  there  is an important  interaction  between  what  the individual  firm 
does and  what  the industry  does. Firms  find  it hard  to resist the industry 
pattern.  When  a few major  firms  accelerate  the wage adjustment  period, 
the entire  industry  does. 
The Payment  Interval for  Labor 
Not only is the indexation  period  unusually  sticky, so is the payment 
period. At high inflation, the relatively infrequent  payment of non- 
indexed wages means that workers  lend to firms  because the real wage 
they ultimately  receive will have been eroded  by inflation.  Robert  Barro 
has explored this issue and concludes that the adjustment  of the fre- 
quency of payments  is quite in line with the expectation  of a theoretical 
model.28  In Barro's  reformulation  of the Baumol-Tobin  money demand 
model, there is a fixed cost of making  wage payments  that leads, other 
things  being equal, to infrequent  payments. But the opportunity  cost of 
holding money balances works in the opposite direction, arguing  for 
frequent  payments, more in line with the pattern  of firms' receipts or 
workers'  disbursements.  Barro  derives a formula  for the optimal  length 
of the payments  period,  p, measured  in months, 
(9)  p  =  XI(r*  +  r), 
where X  is the fixed cost measured  as a fraction  of the monthly  wage, 
and  r* is the real  interest  rate. Table  4 shows illustrative  calculations. 
Barro  considers the case where A =  0.0025 ($1 payment cost for a 
$400  per month worker).  For an inflation  rate of 15 percent per month 
the model  predicts  a pattern  of payments  twice per week. In reality, we 
do not observe anything like that for economies with inflation  rates 
around  15  percent.  The  frequency  of payment  lies between semimonthly 
28.  Barro (1970, 1972a). 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 4.  Relationship between the Optimal Payment Period and the Rate of Inflation, 
for Selected Cost Ratiosa 
Payment period (in months) 
Cost  Inflation  per month 
ratio 
(X)  0.03  0.15  0.30  0.50 
0.0025  0.250  0.125  0.090  0.070 
0.0050  0.354  0.177  0.127  0.099 
0.0075  0.433  0.217  0.156  0.121 
0.0100  0.500  0.250  0.180  0.140 
0.0500  1.119  0.559  0.402  0.313 
Source:  Authors'  own calculations  based on Barro (1970), table  1. 
a.  Calculations  are based  on the equation p  =  XI(r*  +  iTj,  where  r*, the real interest  rate,  is assumed  to be  I 
percent per month; X, the cost  ratio, is the fixed cost  measured as a fraction of the monthly wage. 
and monthly  payments. To reach this pattern  with the Barro  formula, 
the transactions  cost ratio, X, would have to be 20 times larger  than  he 
assumes, amounting  to 5 percent  of the monthly  wage. 
The only point at which the model works well is when explaining  the 
shift to almost daily, and even twice daily, payment when inflation 
reaches hundreds  of percent per month. Even then the model must be 
qualified,  as Steven Webb  notes. The model does not at all accord  with 
the evidence  for inflation  rates  in the range  of 10  to 30  percent  per  month. 
At those levels, payment  patterns  are  much  the same  across  a large  range 
of inflation  rates, even during  periods  of persistent  high  inflation.29 
The basic flaw in the model would seem to be the assumption  that 
firms, like workers, do not have access at low transactions  costs to a 
stable  asset in which to hold receipts. Experience  has shown, however, 
that in countries  with chronically  high inflation  financial  markets  adapt 
to provide stable assets, and when they do not, the dollar  becomes an 
option. Accordingly,  firms  are reluctant  to give up the real  wage erosion 
that comes with infrequent  payments. Were it not for efficiency wage 
arguments,  firms would resist a speedup of payments when inflation 
rises. But even the efficiency  wage argument  is tempered  by the fact that 
the firm's  payment  pattern  depends  on that  of the industry. 
The explanation for both the indexation and the payment period 
problems likely lies in the direction of Thomas Schelling's model of 
29.  Webb (1989, pp. 78-82). Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Federico Sturzenegger,  and Holger Wolf  23 
binary choices. If only a few firms adjust more frequently than the 
industry  norm, nothing  happens  to the industry  pattern.30  But when a 
critical  number  of firms  do adjust  wages, most others follow. Accord- 
ingly,  a logistic  pattern  of adjustment  emerges  at the industry  level. This 
acceleration  in price adjustment  in turn becomes a source of inflation, 
automatically  accommodated  by the increased  money  growth  that  results 
from  the inflation-money  linkage.  The more the various  components  of 
the price level-the  wage rate, public sector prices, and the exchange 
rate-are automatically  indexed  or adjusted  and  the more  accommodat- 
ing monetary  policy is, the more automatic  is the process of high and 
accelerating  inflation. 
The Adjustment of Velocity 
In  this section  we focus on the "flight  from  money" as another  driving 
force in an unstable inflationary  process. As inflation  increases, the 
public substitutes away from money toward other assets and toward 
goods. Adaptation  in financial  markets  creates convenient alternatives 
to money, especially at higher rates of inflation.  In the labor market, 
payment  habits  adapt  and  reduce  real money demand.  The combination 
of these forces leads to the dramatic  rise in velocity, or demonetization, 
in high inflation  economies. Figure 4 shows the steep decline in real 
balances  that  corresponded  to the demonetization  in the Bolivian  hyper- 
inflation. 
Financial  Market Adaptation 
The flight  from  money may take three  basic paths:  a shift  into  foreign 
assets-notably  dollar notes,  domestic dollar deposits, or offshore 
accounts; a shift into interest-bearing  domestic assets within the com- 
mercial banking system or in the money market;  or a shift into real 
assets, whether  they be goods inventories, equity investments, or real 
estate. 
The distinction  between movements along the real money demand 
schedule and shifts in real money demand helps explain the actual 
30. Schelling  (1978). 24  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1990 
Figure 4.  Bolivia: Real Money,  1982-90a 
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Source:  Authors'  own calculations  using Muller and Associates,  Statistical  Reviewv, various issues. 
a.  Real money is the nominal money  supply in the local currency divided by the CPI (1980  =  100). 
dynamics  of real balances  during  an inflation.  The distinction  may also 
explain  why there are hysteresis effects. Once a new financial  product 
is in use, it will continue  to be used even if inflation  declines.31 
The response of real money demand to an increase in the cost of 
holding  money is ordinarily  thought  of as a movement  along a liquidity 
preference  schedule. To some extent that is the case. But, we want to 
make the added  point that there is financial  adaptation.  A black market 
for dollars  develops; as vendors  appear  on every street corner,  holding 
and  using  dollars  becomes more  convenient. When  financial  institutions 
introduce  checkable, interest-bearing  overnight  deposits, holding  non- 
interest  bearing  money becomes unnecessary.  Financial  institutions  are 
31. On the discussion  of such a hysteresis  effect, see Melnik  (1990),  Piterman  (1988), 
and  Ahumada  (1989). Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  25 
Table 5.  Brazil and Argentina: Income Velocity and Ratio of MI to Broader Money 
Supplies, Selected Years 
Brazil  Argentina 
Velocities  Ratio  Velocities  Ratio 
Year  Ml  M4  MJ/M4  Ml  M3  MJ/M3 
1976  8.0  3.5  0.44  11.9  7.4  0.62 
1980  10.7  4.4  0.41  14.0  4.4  0.31 
1984  22.2  3.4  0.15  21.5  7.1  0.33 
1988  34.6  3.2  0.09  24.4  6.0  0.25 
1989  45.5  3.6  0.08  27.8  7.1  0.26 
Source:  Brazilian data for  1980-89 are from Central Bank of Brazil, Brazil Economic  Program,  June  1990, table 
2.4; Brazilian data for 1976 are from Brazil Economic  Program,  June 1987, table 2.4.  Argentine data for 1988-89 are 
from  Fundacion  Mediterranea,  Suplemento  Mensual  Estadistico,  August  1990; the  1976-84  data  are from  World 
Bank, Argentina: Reforms for  Price  Stability and Growth, August  1989, table 6.2. 
not ready-made  to accommodate  the flight  from  money. In the short  run, 
households  may hold more  real balances  than  they will after  alternative 
vehicles become available  or better  known. In practice  this will look like 
adjustment  lags, but  it also reflects  the adjustment  of financial  institutions 
to the increased  inflation. 
Table 5 shows velocities in Brazil  and Argentina.  The data show the 
near total disappearance  of MI and the relative stability  of the velocity 
of  broader orders of  the money supply. But even here there was 
adjustment  because, in some periods, real interest  rates were substan- 
tially negative. 
The adjustment  of M3 (or M4, depending  on national institutions) 
reflects the extent to which financial  markets  can adapt  to inflation  and 
depreciation. Specifically, in a market where nominal interest rates 
substantially  reflect  inflation  and  depreciation,  the velocity of M3 should 
be quite  stable. By contrast,  if interest  rates  are  controlled,  asset holders 
will substitute  out of the financial  system into dollars  or real assets. 
In Brazil, financial  markets substantially  adapted. As a result, the 
velocity of MI rose more than in other countries, while that of M4 
increased less.  The sharp rise in the velocity of MI reflects a well 
organized  payment  system by check (even for a lunch snack) drawn  on 
overnight  accounts. In Argentina,  by contrast, the recurrent  cycles of 
price explosions and freezes, without explicit indexation, drove asset 
holders  out of the financial  system  and  lead  to a pervasive  dollarization.32 
32. See Ortiz  (1983),  Marquez  (1987),  Ramirez-Rojas  (1985),  and  Calvo  (1985)  and  the 
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Dynamics 
The dynamics of real money demand  in response to an increase in 
inflation involve several steps.  First, inflation must increase for a 
sufficiently  long  period  and  must  be expected to remain  high  long  enough 
for new financial  services to be offered. Second, households and firms 
gradually adjust to these new products. Third, as households start 
adjusting,  the new product is offered more pervasively and competi- 
tively, thus speeding  up the response of money holders. 
Once new financial  products  have been adopted,  increases  in the rate 
of inflation  influence  real  money  demand  until  a new threshold  is reached 
where yet more  liquid,  interest-bearing  assets are offered. This process 
converges either to dollarization  or to an economy with most of the 
financial  market  represented  by an interest-bearing  overnight  market. 
A further  influence on velocity, and hence on inflation  dynamics, 
comes from  adjustments  in payment  habits  in goods and  factor  markets. 
In the goods market,  the pervasive acceptance of checks drawn  on the 
overnight  market  reduces transactions  costs and cuts deeply into the 
demand  for a real monetary  base. 
In the labor  market,  as observed  in the inflationary  experiences  of the 
1920s  and  formalized  by Barro  in 1970,  the frequency  of wage disburse- 
ments responds to the cost of holding  money between payments. For 
those in the labor  force who hold only currency,  an increased  frequency 
of payments  translates  into an automatic  rise in velocity. This effect is 
clearly  at work  in  extreme  inflation  experiences,  when  payment  becomes 
daily  and agents  even resort  to barter. 
Indexed Money 
An important  part  of the dynamics  of financial  markets  is the radical 
shortening  of the maturities  of public  debt. In the absence of indexation, 
or of credible  indexation,  asset holders  require  either short-dated  secu- 
rities or high risk premiums.  Governments  respond by shortening  the 
maturity  of the debt. The more precarious  the situation,  the shorter  the 
debt until the point where one-week debt is considered  long term, and 
interest  is credited  daily in the overnight.33  That situation  is obviously 
33. In Brazil, for example, the government  used to issue nominal  three-month  bills 
that had only a week left to maturity. Even these bills were subject to repurchase 
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quite volatile. As a result, funding  crises threaten  daily. Anytime the 
prospect  of real depreciation  emerges, real interest  rates must become 
very positive to encourage  asset holders to roll over their positions for 
yet another  day. The shortening  of maturities  on financial  assets implies 
that  any distinction  between money and debt is lost except in the sense 
that the demand  for a monetary  base almost vanishes and with it the 
scope for seigniorage  disappears  too. 
When  the government  debt  has shortened  sufficiently,  the stage is set 
for a nearly  inflation-proof  financial  system. Financial  institutions  adapt 
by carrying  both government  debt as assets and  interest-bearing,  check- 
able  deposits  as liabilities.  There  may  not even be a reserve  requirement. 
Thus, the demand  for a monetary  base is sharply  reduced. 
The most intriguing  aspect of this arrangement  is the fact that  money 
is effectively indexed. Since MI will become a diminishingly  small 
fraction of the money stock, and since the remainder  carries interest 
rates  that  match  inflation,  money  holdings  are  practically  indexed.  Thus, 
far from being in a situation  where there is substantial  seigniorage,  the 
debt effectively becomes interest-bearing  money and inflation  is self- 
perpetuating  unless the budget  is balanced  or the debt is frozen. 
A Simulation Exercise 
We now pull the various elements together in a simulation  model 
based on microeconomic  optimization. With endogenous pricing fre- 
quencies, endogenous  velocity, and an endogenous  money supply, the 
model  has all  the ingredients  of a highly  unstable  economy. Disturbances 
in the budget  lead easily to an explosive path  for prices. 
We combine  a model of pricing  under  monopolistic  competition  with 
an endogenous money supply process, taking  account of the feedback 
running  from inflation  to government  finance and the individual  con- 
sumption  choices on the pricing  side.34  The model, described  in greater 
detail in the appendix, comprises three monopolistically  competitive 
"sectors" made  up  of producers  and  consumers  maximizing  an  intertem- 
poral  utility  function  defined  over money and goods. Velocity is endog- 
enous with respect to inflation. Individual  producers and consumers 
face demand  curves that depend upon the level of aggregate  demand, 
34. See Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki  (1987).  For  an alternative  approach  see Calvo  (1983). 28  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1990 
which depends on real balances, and relative prices. Solving the max- 
imization  problem (taking  the optimal actions of competitors into ac- 
count)  yields optimal  prices that  are increasing  in aggregate  demand. 
Each  firm  faces an  idiosyncratic  cost of changing  prices. Actual  prices 
are adjusted  to their optimal  level if the utility gain from an adjustment 
exceeds its cost. The model is closed by introducing  the government 
budget  constraint:  the increase  in the nominal  money supply  is passively 
determined  by the seigniorage  required  to cover the deficit.  Government 
expenditure  is exogenous; real revenues suffer from the Tanzi effect, 
and  decrease with the inflation  rate. 
To illustrate  the model, consider  the effects of a 1 percent  increase  in 
government  expenditure,  starting  from  the initial  steady state character- 
ized by a balanced budget and zero inflation. The resulting primary 
deficit  is financed  by money issue, which  increases  real  demand  at given 
prices. Eventually  the divergence between actual and optimal  price is 
sufficiently  large  for the first  of our  three sectors to adjust.  That sector's 
price increase has two effects. It reduces the relative prices of the 
remaining  two sectors and increases the growth  rates of nominal  and, if 
real revenues are sufficiently  sensitive to the inflation  rate, real money. 
Both effects increase the likelihood that the other sectors will adjust 
prices too. 
With a small initial shock and small adjustment  costs, the economy 
will shift to a new stationary  equilibrium  with positive inflation  rates. If 
the initial shock is sufficiently  large, no stationary  equilibrium  may be 
found. Similarly, if the eventual adjustment of  the third sector is 
sufficiently large, it may reduce real revenues enough to push the 
economy into hyperinflation. 
The model captures  several characteristics  of hyperinflation  experi- 
ences. 
-Multiple equilibria.  With  a balanced  budget,  no monetization  occurs 
and the economy remains at a zero inflation equilibrium.  For small 
deficits,  the  economy  tends  toward  stationary  equilibrium  inflation  paths. 
For large deficits, the feedback effects from the pricing rules to the 
budget  deficit dominate,  and the inflation  solution eventually becomes 
nonstationary. 
-Zigzag  patterns  of real prices.  With differential adjustment costs, 
relative  prices are characterized  by periods of sustained  decline, inter- 
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-Choppy  inflation  rates. The optimal  adjustment  frequency  differs 
across sectors as well as over time, due to dependence  on the aggregate 
inflation  rate. As a result, the overall inflation  rate is highly variable. 
Periods  of virtual  price stability  are interspersed  with sudden bouts of 
rapid  inflation.35 
-Hysteresis.  A sufficiently  large transitory  increase in government 
expenditure  can  increase  real  balances  enough  to induce  price  adjustment 
by firms. The resulting  inflation  can shift the economy from an initial 
zero inflation  to a new steady state with positive inflation,  lower  real  tax 
receipts, and continued  monetization  of the primary  deficit. 
-Butterfly effects. In  the  presence  of adjustment  costs, the  cumulative 
rather than the current deficit determines pricing behavior. A small 
deficit, maintained  long enough, eventually triggers  price adjustment. 
Thus, a period of apparent  price tranquility  may suddenly  give way to 
hyperinflation. 
Figure  5 presents simulation  results that illustrate  some of the above 
features. The simulation  shows the response of an economy to shocks 
that  take the form  of modest, exogenous budget  deficits. The first  panel 
shows the inflation  rate  for an economy where the government's  budget 
is subject to a large Tanzi effect. For several periods the government 
runs  a small  budget  deficit  and  little  happens.  But, eventually  the buildup 
in aggregate  demand  causes prices to be readjusted,  which feeds back 
into the money creation process. In the end, the economy takes an 
unstable  path  with increasing  inflation. 
The second  panel  shows the evolution  of the change  in relative  prices, 
as measured by a dissynchronization  index. Again, we focus on an 
economy in which the government's  budget  is subject to a large Tanzi 
effect. The index is computed  as the average  of the absolute change in 
relative  prices compared  to the fastest adjusting  sector of the economy. 
With zero inflation,  relative prices are constant and the value of the 
index  is zero. As inflation  picks  up, some sectors  lag  behind.  The  induced 
changes in relative prices increase the index. In the final stage of 
hyperinflation,  not shown in the figure,  there is a shift to exchange  rate 
pricing  and  relative  prices are once again  aligned. 
The last panel shows an alternative  scenario  with the budget  deficit 
subject  to a small  Tanzi  effect. The pattern  of inflation  is characterized 
35. This  feature  results  from  the small  number  of agents  in the model. 30  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Figure 5.  Simulation of the Effects of a Budget Deficit 
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by strong fluctuations as  some sectors adjust at discrete intervals. 
Average  inflation,  however, is modest  and  does not explode. 
Open Economy Aspects 
Inflation  dynamics  are  often  discussed  using  the  framework  of a closed 
economy in which the exchange rate does not play a central  role in the 
inflation  process. This view is quite explicitly made  by Cagan.  Thomas 
Sargent and Neil Wallace also do not allow any special role for the 
exchange rate or for other aspects of an open economy.36  By contrast, 
Much of the discussion in the 1920s and more recently in the 1980s 
focuses on whether  the external sector does play a key role, if not the 
leading  one. In fact, the debate  between the balance  of payments  school 
and the quantity  theory school turns  on precisely this point.37 
If the external  sector and the exchange rate do play an independent 
role, depreciation and inflation cannot be fully correlated-that  is, 
purchasing  power parity  must not hold. An easy measure  of the extent 
to which this is the case is the behavior  of the real exchange  rate. Figure 
6 shows the real exchange  rate  for Argentina.  The large  variations  in the 
real exchange rate leave no doubt that an assumption of purchasing 
power parity  is far from actual experience. The same picture emerges 
for any other  high  inflation  country. 
Linkages  to Money  Creation 
The  external  sector  directly  affects  the  growth  rate  of money  in several 
ways. First, the real exchange rate is a determinant  of the real budget 
because the government  has foreign exchange receipts (from exports) 
or foreign  exchange outlays (from  debt service), the value of which in 
domestic  prices varies with the real exchange rate. Real exchange rate 
changes  also affect the real revenue from ad valorem export or import 
taxes. Second, governments practice multiple exchange rates. As a 
result  the budget  deficit is affected by the differential  between average 
buying and selling rates. Finally, external debt service shifts from 
36.  Sargent (1982); Sargent and Wallace (1973a). 
37.  See Bresciani-Turroni (1937), Graham (1930), Ellis (1934), Rist (1966), Robinson 
(1938), Polak (1943), Dornbusch (1987), and Montiel (1989). 32  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Figure 6.  Argentina: Real Effective Exchange Rate,  1970-90 
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Source:  Unpublished  data from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. 
automatic financing through rolling over debt to domestic financing 
through  creating  money. 
Consider  again  the equation  defining  money creation, 
(10)  M/PY=O+xx+z, 
where 0 now denotes the domestic deficit, x the external public debt 
service, and z the private sector's external  balance;  all these variables 
are expressed as a fraction  of GNP. The term X is the fraction  of debt 
service that is financed  by domestic money creation. Arminio Fraga, 
Jeffrey Sachs and Juan  Antonio Morales, and Rudiger  Dornbusch  and 
Juan  Carlos  de Pablo  have argued  that  the sudden  need to serve external 
debt, and the resulting  domestic money creation, has been an initiating 
factor  in the inflations  of the 1980s.38 
38.  Fraga (1986); Sachs and Morales (1988); Dornbusch and de Pablo (1989). Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  33 
A real depreciation  raises the real value of debt service, and hence 
leads to money  creation.  Similarly,  if the government  runs  a noninterest 
deficit in foreign exchange, this will increase as a source of money 
creation  in the case of real depreciation.  The same is true  for an across- 
the-board  real  depreciation  under  multiple  exchange  rates that involves 
buying  rates  below selling  rates. 
High  inflation  experiences  tend to occur during  wartime,  but  can also 
occur in the aftermath  of disruptions  that have a significant  external 
dimension. External debt service plays a special role when there is a 
shift from external financing  of debt service (and possibly even of the 
domestic deficit)  to domestic  financing.  The domestic financing,  if done 
by money creation, inevitably raises the rate of money creation and 
hence translates  into higher inflation.  In the 1920s, the argument  was 
widely accepted that reparation  payments created a double transfer 
problem, in the budget and in the balance of payments, that was 
responsible  for the acceleration  of German  inflation.39  After 1982,  debtor 
countries serviced their debts, at least partially,  rather  than relying  on 
automatic rollover. In terms of equation 10, making no payments- 
neither principal  nor interest-avoids  any monetary  financing  of debt 
service. The shift to substantial  debt service immediately  increases the 
rate  of money creation  associated  with a given noninterest  deficit. 
While  external  debt problems  may lead to increased  money creation 
and  inflation,  they do not always do so. Some heavily  indebted  countries 
have  been able  to avoid  extreme  inflation  by using  domestic  debt  finance. 
Table 6 compares low and high inflation  countries. Both groups have 
approximately  the same debt ratio and debt service burdens. Besides 
the difference  in fiscal  deficits, the groups  differ  in that  89 percent  of the 
29 high inflation  countries have debt service problems, while only 27 
percent of the low inflation  countries experience debt problems. Thus 
high  inflation  appears  to go hand-in-hand  with debt service problems. 
In  countries  where  debt  service  causes an extreme  inflation,  reduction 
or abandonment  of debt service, or of reparations  in the case of the 
1920s,  is pivotal  to stabilization:  it slows money  creation,  thus  eliminating 
a driving  force of high inflation.  Sachs and Morales believe this was a 
key step in the successful Bolivian  stabilization.40 
39. See German  Foreign  Office  (1922)  and  Webb  (1989). 
40. Sachs  and  Morales  (1988). 34  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 6.  Debt and Inflation in Developing Countries, 1983-89a 
Percent 
Low  High 
inflation  inflation 
countriesb  countriesb 
Debtc  39.5  45.9 
Debt servicec  7.3  5.8 
Fiscal  deficitc  1.3  7.5 
Annual money  growth  12.0  187.8 
Source:  International Monetary Fund,  World Economic  Outlook,  May  1990, pp. 59 and 61. 
a.  The  sample  includes  88 net-debtor  developing  countries.  All  numbers are weighted  averages  over  the  period 
calculated  with GDP weights. 
b.  Countries  with  less  than  6  percent  annual  (CPI)  inflation  were  classified  as  low  inflation  countries,  while 
countries  with more than 15 percent annual inflation were considered  high inflation countries. 
c.  Debt,  debt service,  and fiscal deficit are expressed  as percent  of GNP. 
The terms  of trade  also link the external  sector and  the budget.  There 
may  be a direct  link  if the government  owns a major  primary  commodity 
operation, such as oil in Mexico. In that case, a deterioration  in the 
terms  of trade  directly  reduces  government  revenue  and  leads to financ- 
ing problems.  Even if the government  does not directly  own the opera- 
tion, government  revenue is still affected through  taxes on profits  and 
general taxation. A commodity boom helps the budget, a commodity 
depression  hurts  it. 
The terms of trade linkage has played a key role in several high 
inflation  countries.  In  Mexico, the terms  of trade  have declined  by nearly 
a half since 1980,  mostly a reflection  of the decline in world  oil prices. In 
Bolivia and Argentina,  major  terms of trade deterioration  has signifi- 
cantly  worsened  the budgets.  On  the other  hand,  the terms  of trade  have, 
if anything,  improved  in some countries  like Brazil. 
Asset  Market Linkages 
In the asset market,  the availability,  legal or illegal, of external  assets 
plays a central role in the inflation process. The alternative cost of 
holding  domestic assets is given by the return  on dollar assets, which 
includes interest  plus currency  depreciation.  Even when foreign  assets 
have  to be held  in  the  form  of currency,  depreciation  is still  the alternative 
cost of holding  domestic nominal  assets. 
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significantly  reduces the transactions  costs to economic agents of the 
"flight from money." This ability makes real money demand more 
responsive to higher inflation  in those economies where no domestic 
financial  market  exists. The effect is reinforced  if foreign  monies  become 
acceptable  and are routinely  used as a means of payment. In that case 
even foreign assets carry the nonpecuniary  returns associated with 
domestic  currency. 
Consider the case where external assets mostly take the form of 
noninterest-bearing  currency  or deposits, with a return  equal  to the rate 
of currency  depreciation.  Let 4r  denote the expected rate  of depreciation 
and assume that velocity depends on the alternative  cost of holding 
domestic rather  than external assets: V =  ot +  Pt4.  Now, anticipated 
real depreciation  becomes an additional  inflationary  factor. Equation  5 
is modified  to read 
ot0 +  P3(41 
-  'a) 
(11)  IT=|  (1 -10) 
The prospect of real depreciation, according to equation 11, raises 
velocity and hence raises the rate of money creation at each rate of 
inflation.  Moreover,  the availability  of external  assets tends to raise the 
value of a.  and  possibly 1 since foreign  money is presumably  more  liquid 
and  hence a better  substitute  for domestic money than  goods. 
Depreciation  and Inflation 
Another  potential  channel  for external  influence  stems from a direct 
impact  of exchange  rate  changes  on the pricing  process.41 This  can occur 
because the exchange rate affects the price of imported  inputs such as 
oil. Currency  depreciation  also raises the prices of import-competing 
goods and exportables, and can exert pressure on wages through  the 
increased cost  of  living. This is  particularly  likely when a formal 
indexation  mechanism  exists. 
An interaction  between inflation and currency depreciation  arises 
almost mechanically when there is explicit or implicit indexation of 
wages.  In such  a situation  a real  depreciation  will be an  automatic  source 
of inflation  acceleration. Several of the initial rises in inflation  in the 
1980s  may  be traced  to this channel. 
41. On  this issue, see Dornbusch  (1982)  and  Bruno  and Fischer  (1986). 36  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Consider a simple model of the wage-price sector. Current  wage 
increases are based on lagged  inflation  and on activity, y. Current  infla- 
tion is the weighted  average  of wage inflation  and  nominal  exchange  rate 
depreciation, 4.  In this setting, for a given level of activity or real 
demand,  the acceleration  of inflation  will depend  on the level of activity 
and the rate of real depreciation,  i  -  , 
(12)  As  = 'I'(  -  ')  + NY 
We have already  seen that  real  exchange  rates are not constant;  accord- 
ingly, if formal  or informal  indexation  is a significant  part  of the pricing 
process, real depreciation  must lead to an acceleration  of inflation,  not 
only through  potential  budget  effects but  also through  pricing  directly.42 
Under a managed  exchange rate regime, the rate of currency  depre- 
ciation is set officially. Real depreciation  occurs when the government 
decides to improve external competitiveness. If the exchange rate is 
flexible, or if the black market  exchange rate plays an important  role in 
the inflation  equation, we must consider the exchange rate to be an 
auction price that is determined  in a forward-looking  fashion. In this 
context, anticipation of budgetary problems can lead to a currency 
depreciation and acceleration of inflation even ahead of the actual 
deficits. 
Table  7 explores the role of the real exchange  rate  by asking  whether 
real currency  depreciation  is a significant  determinant  in inflation.  The 
quarterly  inflation  rate  is explained  by lagged  inflation,  real  depreciation, 
and an incomes policy dummy.  There is no claim that the specification 
should be the same for all countries. Indexation  arrangements,  adjust- 
ment in public sector prices, and the prevailing  level of slack in the 
economy, which depends in part  on the extent of monetary  accommo- 
dation, all play a role in shaping  both the timing and effect of a real 
depreciation.  The basic point is that real depreciation  acts as a shock 
that  will, over time, raise the rate  of inflation.43 
42. In Brazil,  for  example,  full  backward  indexation  was mandatory  in the early  1980s. 
43. We concentrate  here on exchange rate shocks. Major  changes in public sector 
prices also have the effect of a sharp increase in inflation.  An example would be the 
Peruvian  adjustment  program  in the fall of 1988.  Public  sector price adjustments  tend to 
come together  with  exchange  rate  correction  and  hence the separate  role of each of these 
shocks  may  be difficult  to establish. Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  37 
Table 7.  Effect of Real Depreciation on Inflation, Israel and Mexico,  197149a 
Inflation  Incomes  Real 
Country  One lag,  Two  lags  policyb  depreciationc  R2 
Israel  0.52  0.37  -0.28  0.33  0.66 
(5.0)  (3.6)  (2.0)  (2.1) 
Mexicod  0.89  .  .  .  -  23.6  0.16  0.73 
(15.6)  (3.4)  (2.2) 
Source:  Authors' own calculations.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  Inflation is  regressed  on lagged  inflation,  incomes  policy  dummy,  and real depreciation  using  quarterly data. 
The value of the constant  is not reported. 
b.  A dummy  variable  is  used  for incomes  policy.  For the  first four  quarters of  an incomes  policy  the  variable 
equals one.  At all other times,  the variable equals zero.  In Israel, the incomes  policy  variable equals  one from the 
third quarter of  1985 to the first quarter of  1986; in Mexico,  from the second  quarter of  1988 to the second  quarter 
of  1989. When the incomes  policy  variable enters  the equation  with a value  of one,  the dummy takes  on the value 
of lagged inflation. 
c.  Real depreciation for Israel is one-quarter lagged depreciation; for Mexico,  a four-quarter polynomial distributed 
lag. 
d.  The equation for Mexico  is corrected  for serial correlation. 
Granger Tests 
Thus far, we have considered the possibility that shocks to the 
exchange rate, just as much as shocks to public sector prices or the 
budget,  could  be the dominant  factor  in propagating  inflation.  To explore 
the role of exchange rates further,  we now consider Granger  causality 
and structural  vector autoregression  (VAR) tests. We believe that the 
body of evidence shows, in a number  of different  and complementary 
ways, that  exchange  rates  play  a key and  independent  role  in the inflation 
process. 
If, from  Granger  causality  tests, exchange  rates  can  be shown  to affect 
money and prices, it would suggest that many earlier  tests that disre- 
garded  the exchange  rate  were misspecified.  Specifically,  Granger  caus- 
ality running  from  exchange  rates to inflation  and money growth  would 
support  the balance  of payments  view, which  argues  for this direction  of 
causation. 
In table 8 we report the chi-squared  test statistic on whether each 
variable  is significant  when added  to a VAR regression  of the other  two 
variables  in the table." Three lags were used uniformly.  Consider  the 
44. As Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) point out, the statistical  interpretation  of 
causality tests between (co-)integrated  series depends on the precise form of non- 
stationarity  in the data. Our interest here lies only in the relative importance  of the 
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Table 8.  Causality Tests on the Exchange Rate, Money, and Prices in Selected High 
Inflation Countriesa 
Exchange 
Country  Money  rate  Prices 
Argentina  8.1  39.7  15.3 
Bolivia  18.7  19.1  5.7 
Brazil  3.3  9.7  5.9 
Peru  8.4  3.7  12.1 
Yugoslavia  10.7  9.0  1.8 
Source:  Authors' own calculations. 
a.  The  table reports the chi-squared  test  statistic  on the joint  exclusion  of each  variable from a VAR regression 
of the other two variables.  The values  should be compared to the chi-squared critical values  at the following  levels: 
10 percent level,  10.64; 5 percent level,  12.59; 1 percent level,  16.81. 
middle  column  that reports  the significance  test of the exchange rate as 
an extra variable  in a system already  composed of money and prices. 
Clearly  the exchange  rate belongs in the system as much  as money and 
prices do. 
Structural VARs 
Structural  VAR estimation  provides an alternative  methodology  for 
studying the effect of the exchange rate on the inflationary  process. 
Using this technique, we are able to decompose the variance in the 
inflation  series into the components due to innovations in alternative 
causal" variables. 
Peter Montiel has used VAR estimation to analyze hyperinflation 
episodes. He attempts  to discriminate  between the fiscal view and the 
balance of payments view; he concludes in favor of the latter. While 
Montiel  uses ordering  assumptions  to determine  the  relative  contribution 
of the causal  variables,  we follow Olivier  Blanchard  and  Danny  Quah  by 
employing  restrictions  derived  from  economic theory.45 
We  restrict  our  attention  to three  variables:  inflation,  the  real  exchange 
rate, and the real deficit, which is proxied by the ratio of base money 
45. Both  approaches  have  their  drawbacks.  While  ordering  assumptions  are  essentially 
arbitrary,  our  results  depend  critically  on the correctness  of the economic  restrictions  we 
impose.  See Montiel  (1989)  and  Blanchard  and  Quah  (1989). Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  39 
creation  to prices.46  Identification  of the system requires  three restric- 
tions. We assume  that, in the long run,  innovations  in neither  the budget 
nor  the inflation  rate  affect  the real  exchange  rate.  In  addition,  we assume 
that, in the short  run, shocks to the deficit  affect the real exchange  rate 
with  a lag. 
The first  two restrictions  derive  from  the long-run  dependence  of the 
real exchange rate on real factors. The last restriction  is based on the 
fact that money demand  is a function  of inflation  and not of the deficit. 
Imposing  these three  restrictions,  we can  compute  the structural  impulse 
response  functions. 
The impulse response functions yield estimates of  the variance 
decomposed by the percentage of the k-period  forecast error that is 
explained  by innovations  to the three  series. Table  9 presents  the results 
for  Argentina. 
The table shows that the budget deficit reacts passively to inflation 
and exchange rate shocks. The independent  contribution  of the deficit 
to the inflation  rate is almost negligible.  These results strongly  suggest 
that the endogeneity of  the deficit is  crucial in understanding  the 
inflationary  process. 
Neither shocks to the inflation  rate nor shocks to the deficit exert 
substantial  influence  on the real exchange  rate. The real exchange  rate, 
however, influences  both inflation  and the deficit, supporting  the view 
that  the exchange  rate  constitutes  a crucial  element,  and  not a sideshow, 
of the inflationary  process. 
Table 10 extends the evidence on the variance in inflation  to other 
countries.  The first  panel  provides  strong  support  for the importance  of 
the exchange rate in determining  the inflationary  process. The second 
panel  suggests  that the effect of innovations  to the budget  deficit  differs 
substantially  across countries. While  in Argentina  and Brazil  the deficit 
was basically endogenous  to the inflation  process, it was an important 
driving  force in Bolivia and Mexico. Finally the third  panel illustrates 
how  inflation  feeds on itself  as institutions  adapt  to the new environment. 
46. All variables  were transformed  into stationary  series. If the variables  are co- 
integrated  in the levels, the moving  average  representation  is not invertible.  To rule  out 
this case, we tested for and rejected co-integration.  We approximate  the deficit by 
seigniorage  collection  except in the case of Argentina  where  we use the change  in the real 
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Table 9.  Argentina: Decomposition of the Variance among the Exchange Rate, Deficit, 
and Inflation, 1982-89 
Percent 
Innovations  in 
Real 
exchange  Deficit 
Variable  Months in forecast  rate  proxya  Inflation 
Inflation  1  26.7  1.3  71.9 
10  28.8  3.1  68.0 
24  25.5  3.0  71.4 
50  24.6  3.0  72.3 
Real  exchange  rate  1  83.6  0.0  16.3 
10  83.0  1.0  15.9 
24  87.9  0.7  11.3 
50  92.5  0.5  7.0 
Deficit proxya  1  4.8  73.3  21.7 
10  33.7  41.3  24.9 
24  33.3  42.1  24.4 
50  34.2  43.0  22.7 
Source:  Authors' own calculations.  The table gives the results from impulse response functions that yield estimates 
of the variance decomposed  by the percentage of the k-period fofecast  error that is explained  by innovations  to the 
three series. 
a.  The real deficit is proxied by the ratio of the change in real claims on the private sector  to the price level. 
Argentina  and Brazil show the highest feedback effects, Bolivia and 
Mexico the lowest. 
Summary 
So far, we have identified several elements of the high inflation 
process: endogenous money, endogenous  changes in pricing  patterns, 
financial  adaptation  that accommodates  the economizing on real bal- 
ances, as well as causal movements  in exchange  rates. These elements 
combine  to make  inflation  explosive. 
As the general  price  level rises, inertia  in price  and wage adjustments 
and  resistance  to deficit  finance  disappear  throughout  the economy. As 
a result, inflation  accelerates. This process is not an overnight  phenom- 
enon nor a common  occurrence.  But in countries  with chronically  high 
inflation,  a shock to the budget or real exchange rate can trigger  the 
process; if that occurs, gradual  policy adjustinent  will not be enough  to 
bring  inflation  under  control. In fact, after  an extreme inflation  experi- 
ence, the ability to hold inflation  at 5 or 10 percent per month will be Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  41 
Table 10.  Decomposition of the Variance in Inflation in Selected Countries 
Percent 
Variable,  country,  and  Months  in  forecast 
time  period  I  10  24  50 
Due to real exchange rate 
Argentina (1982-89)  26.7  28.8  25.5  24.6 
Brazil (1975-90)  45.1  23.0  18.7  17.1 
Brazil (1982-90)  47.4  21.7  16.8  14.8 
Peru (1985-90)  0.7  16.8  24.2  27.1 
Bolivia (1982-86)  46.3  12.5  6.7  3.8 
Mexico  (1975-87)  28.1  39.3  41.5  42.3 
Mexico  (1982-87)  45.7  39.0  40.4  41.0 
Due to deficit  proxya 
Argentina (1982-89)  1.3  3.1  3.0  3.0 
Brazil (1975-90)  6.1  3.9  3.6  3.5 
Brazil (1982-90)  10.1  7.3  7.0  6.9 
Peru (1985-90)  27.2  25.6  23.7  23.0 
Bolivia (1982-86)  31.9  51.6  58.3  61.6 
Mexico  (1975-87)  30.0  38.2  38.7  39.0 
Mexico  (1982-87)  12.0  50.6  53.3  54.4 
Due to inflation 
Argentina (1982-89)  71.9  68.0  71.4  72.3 
Brazil (1975-90)  48.7  73.0  77.6  79.4 
Brazil (1982-90)  42.4  70.9  76.1  78.2 
Peru (1985-90)  72.0  57.5  52.0  49.7 
Bolivia  (1982-86)  21.7  35.8  34.8  34.4 
Mexico  (1975-87)  41.8  22.4  19.6  18.5 
Mexico  (1982-87)  42.2  10.3  6.1  4.5 
Source:  Authors'  own calculations.  The table gives the results  from  impulse  response  functions,  which  give the 
percent  of the k-period  forecast  error  that  can be explained  by innovations  to the series. 
a. The deficit  is proxied  by the ratio  of the change  in base money  to the price  level, except in Argentina,  where 
the proxy  is the ratio  of the change  in the real  claims  on the public  sector  to the price  level. 
totally lost.  Hysteresis effects weaken the economy's resistance to 
shocks and accelerate  the responses to bad news, making  the economy 
extremely vulnerable  to inflationary  shocks. Extremely low inflation 
may  then  be the only stable  option. 
Charles  Kindleberger  notes, "The fact that  the French  franc  is weak 
when  the Chamber  of Deputies is sitting  or when an unbalanced  budget 
is announced  is due to the fact that  the French  public  fears uncontrolled 
inflation  and begins to export capital.  " 47 To some extent, expectations 
of inflation  are self-fulfilling,  given the link between real depreciation 
47.  Kindleberger (1937, p. 106). 42  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
and inflation  on the one hand, and between inflation  and money growth 
on the other.48 
Thus, Cagan  quite  explicitly  rejects  the view that exchange  rates  can 
play a central  role.49  The evidence offered here suggests that exchange 
rates  play a causal  role in hyperinflations.  The high  inflation  process can 
create such fragility  in the economy that a collapse of the exchange  rate 
may  well trigger  explosive inflation.  Of  course, a collapse  of the exchange 
rate  must  ultimately  be linked  to changes  in fundamentals,  whether  they 
be reparations,  debt service, or capital  flight.50 
Three Stabilizations 
In  this section  we briefly  report  key facts of the stabilization  programs 
in Israel,  Bolivia, and  Argentina.  While  the first  two succeeded, the third 
is a textbook  example  of failed  adjustment  and  lack of credibility.  These 
cases provide background  for the discussion of conceptual issues that 
follows. 
Israel 
Inflation  in Israel  escalated  from  an average  annual  rate  of 60 percent 
in 1975-80  to a nearly 200 percent average annual  rate in 1980-85. By 
early 1985,  following  the breakdown  of a number  of stabilization  efforts 
involving  wage agreements,  inflation  reached  28 percent per month. A 
coalition government-with  substantial U.S.  prodding and financial 
backing-developed a strikingly  successful  stabilization  program.51  Data 
for Israel  are reported  in table 11. 
The Israeli  stabilization  program  had  four  characteristics.  First, fiscal 
48. The debate between Friedman  (1956)  and Nurkse (1944)  is pertinent  here, as is 
Polak's (1943) explanation  of European depreciation.  In the French "psychological 
theory"  of the exchanges,  Aftalion  (1948)  paid  attention  to expectations-driven  exchange 
rates. 
49. He observes (1956,  pp. 90-91, fn. 41): "To my knowledge  no one has argued  that 
depreciation  of the foreign-exchange  rate is sufficient  to explain  hyperinflations,  but it is 
often considered  to be a causal  factor.  The attempts  to find  statistical  confirmation  of this 
view are inadequate  and  unconvincing." 
50. See Krugman  (1979),  Obstfeld  (1984),  and van Wijnbergen  (1988)  for models of 
speculative  attack  on unsustainable  exchange  rate  regimes. 
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Table 11.  Israel's Stabilization,  1984-89 
Percent 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Inflation  rate  374  305  48  20  16  20 
Growth  rate  2.4  3.6  3.3  7.1  1.8  1.4 
Deficita  10.4  2.6  -1.9  1.3  4.6  4.7 
Terms  of trade  indexb  99  113  105  101  91  93 
Real wage indexc  89  85  96  105  109  107 
Real interest  rated  .  .  .  100  33  39  25  15 
Sources:  Bank  of Israel,  Bruno  and Meridor  (1990),  and the International  Monetary  Fund. 
a. The deficit  is expressed  as a percent  of GNP. 
b. The terms  of trade  are defined  as the relative  price  of foreign  goods, taking  April  1986  =  100. 
c.  For the real  wage index, April  1986 =  100. 
d. The real  interest  rate  is the average  short-term  rate. 
policy was tightened  substantially.  The budget  deficit  was cut dramati- 
cally  by abandoning  high  cost investment  projects,  eliminating  subsidies, 
and  raising  tax collection. In 1980-84,  net tax revenue  had  averaged  21.8 
percent  of GNP; by 1985-87,  it had increased  to 30.7 percent. 
Second, tripartite  wage agreements  supported  the shift to a low rate 
of inflation.52  Third,  the exchange rate was adjusted  and kept fixed for 
more than a year. Fourth,  the United States provided  financial  backing 
on the order  of $1.5 billion,  or nearly  4 percent  of Israeli  GNP. Although 
never tapped,  this reserve  helped sustain  confidence  in the program. 
The results of the program  were immediate  disinflation,  a 20 percent 
rise in real wages, a real appreciation  in the currency, and high real 
interest rates. The stabilization  is credited  with significant  real growth 
in the succeeding  two years. 
By 1989,  however, the success of the stabilization  program  was being 
called into question. Growth had by then slowed down to moderate 
levels, and inflation  had settled at 15-20 percent, too high for comfort 
and too low to warrant  an all-out attack. Could disinflation  have been 
more  successful?  Could  growth  have lasted longer  if the incomes policy 
had not been used? Should the exchange rate have been held at fixed 
levels at the cost of overvaluation? 
The 1988-90  stagnation  may, however, be overly ascribed  to the 1985 
stabilization.  The stagnation  may, in fact, be the product  of an extraor- 
dinarily  overregulated  economy. 
52. See Artstein and Sussman (1990) for detailed discussion of the role of wage 
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Bolivia 
Bolivia was drawn  into a hyperinflation  by terms  of trade  shocks and 
increasing difficulty in servicing external debt, which resulted from 
credit rationing  in world capital markets. Vast budget deficits were 
financed  by money creation, and inflation  accelerated  dramatically  to 
reach record levels by mid-1985.  Stabilization  was achieved through 
uncompromising  control of the budget and pervasive liberalization  of 
trade and payments, wages, and prices. Some data on Bolivia are 
presented  in table 12. 
A key step in getting the budget  under  control, which was urged  by 
their  foreign  adviser,  was the suspension  of external  debt service.53  This 
single move substantially  reduced financing  requirements  and helped 
limit  cuts in  the noninterest  budget.  Moreover,  foreign  resources,  mostly 
in the form of aid, were able to finance the residual budget deficit. 
Accordingly,  money creation  was brought  decisively under  control. 
Real tax revenue rose threefold  within a year and fourfold  between 
1984  and 1989!  Seigniorage  declined  sharply;  what  seigniorage  remained 
primarily  reflected  remonetization  rather  than deficit  finance.  Credit  to 
the public  sector declined  from  71 percent  of M2 in 1984  to 16  percent  in 
1989. The continuing overall deficit was substantially  financed from 
abroad. Foreign exchange transactions  were fully liberalized,  and the 
exchange  rate  was determined  at auction.  With  greater  financial  stability 
and a resumption  of market  mechanisms,  output  recovered somewhat, 
though  it remained  below its 1980  level.54 
Just as in Israel, however, inflation  now seems stuck in the double 
digits. This has occurred  even though  monetary  policy has been decid- 
edly orthodox  since 1985.  The financial  system never returned  to a local 
currency  habitat.  In fact, Bolivia seems to be moving  increasingly  away 
from it. The gross investment  rate continues to be exceptionally  low- 
10  percent  of GNP  in 1986-89  and  not rising.  Whether  the low investment 
level reflects a lack of confidence or a lack of opportunity  is open to 
question. 
53. See Sachs (1987), Morales (1988, 1989),  Morales  and Sachs (1990), and Pastor 
(1990).  An experience  with high  inflation  in the 1950s,  though  not as extreme,  and  a very 
similar  stabilization  program  are  reported  in Eder  (1968). 
54. The fact that output  did not return  to the level of 1980  is explained  in part  by a 
strong  adverse  terms  of trade  shock in the period.  When  adjusted  for population  growth, 
real  income  in 1989  was 10  percent  below  the 1984  level and  25 percent  below  that  of 1980. Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  45 
Table 12.  Bolivia's Stabilization, 1984-89 
Percent 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Inflation  rate  1281  11750  276  15  16  15 
Growth  rate  -0.3  -0.2  -2.9  2.2  2.7  2.5 
Deficita  26.5  10.8  3.0  8.2  7.5  ... 
Seignioragea  15.1  8.4  2.2  2.1  2.8  2.2 
Terms  of trade  indexb  100  94  85  69  62 
Real interest  ratec  -89  -96  0  29  15  20 
Sources:  Banco  Central  de Bolivia,  Morales  (1990),  and the International  Monetary  Fund. 
a. The deficit  and seigniorage  are expressed  as a percent  of GNP. 
b. The terms  of trade  are defined  as the relative  price  of foreign  goods when 1984  is taken  as 100. 
c. The real  interest  rate  is the lending  rate. 
Argentina 
Argentina  never stabilized, though there was no shortage of pro- 
grams.55  Starting  with the Austral  plan, a new one was launched  at least 
once a year. But they all failed because fiscal policy never decisively 
changed.  Deficits always reemerged  and  were financed  by money crea- 
tion, money that nobody wanted to hold. As a result, the plans relied 
almost exclusively on incomes policy and exchange rate policy. In the 
late stages, they relied  on unsustainably  high  real  exchange  rates. Each 
program  led to a collapse, after  which a new program  was inaugurated. 
In the aftermath  of successive stabilization  attempts, inflation  would 
reach still higher  levels, and adaptation  to high  inflation  would become 
more  advanced. Some data on the Argentine  experience are presented 
in table 13. 
The contrast  between  the experience  of Argentina  and  those of Israel 
and  Bolivia  is striking.  The decline  in real  wages and  the cumulative  and 
continuing  decline in real income, which resulted from a progressive 
destruction  of the productive  sector, add up to a very negative verdict 
on economic policymaking  in the 1980s, particularly  since 1985  when 
recurrent  stabilization  efforts were made. Variability  in real exchange 
rates, real  wages, and real interest  rates has been exceptionally  high  in 
Argentina.  But the degree of damage has been most evident in the 
cumulative  experience:  per capita  output  is below its level in the 1970s, 
net investment  has been negative for years, and the real return  on an 
investment in the Argentine financial system has been, on average, 
55. See Dornbusch  and de Pablo  (1989),  Heyman  (1990),  and Canavese  and Di Tella 
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Table 13.  Argentina's Failed Stabilization, 1984-89 
Percent 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Inflation rate  627  672  90  131  343  3079 
Growth rate  2.6  -4.5  5.6  2.2  -2.7  -4.6 
Budgeta  11.2  9.9  5.4  8.1  8.5  10.3 
Real wage indexb  100  84  83  79  74  70 
Sources: Banco  Central  de Argentina,  Indicadores  de Coyuntura  and the International  Monetary  Fund. 
a. The budget  is the domestically  financed  budget  as a percent  of GNP. 
b. For the real  wage  index, 1986  =  100. 
severely  negative.  One Austral deposited  in  1983, with  interest  rein- 
vested,  would have declined in real terms to only 2 percent of its initial 
value by early 1990. 
Stabilization  Issues 
The  endogeneity  of  the  money  supply,  financial  adaptation,  and 
pricing all contribute to the process  of explosive  inflation. To end this 
inflationary process,  a government  must radically change  the  money 
supply process.  When money becomes  exogenous,  inflation will even- 
tually end. Sargent emphasized this point. 
The essential  measures  that ended hyperinflation  in each of Germany,  Austria, 
Hungary  and  Poland  were, first,  the creation  of an independent  central  bank  that 
was legally committed  to refuse the government's  demand  for additional  unse- 
cured  credit and, second, a simultaneous  alteration  in the fiscal policy regime. 
These measures were interrelated  and coordinated. They had the effect of 
binding the government to place its debt with private parties and foreign 
governments  which would value that debt according  to whether  it was backed 
by sufficiently  large  prospective  taxes relative  to public  expenditures.  In each 
case that  we have  studied,  once it became  widely  understood  that  the  government 
would not rely on the central  bank  for its finances,  the inflation  terminated  and 
the exchanges  stabilized.56 
Even within this framework, questions remain and important choices 
must be made. Does stabilization mean recession? When is the best time 
to stop inflation? Should incomes  policy  be a part of the stabilization? 
What nominal anchor should the government choose? 
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The answers  to these questions  must  involve wider  issues of political 
economy and  the role of credibility  in promoting  low-cost stabilization. 
Beyond  the theoretical  arguments,  there  is now a body of evidence  from 
the experiments  of 1980s  as well as the 1920s. 
Stabilization  and  Activity 
Stabilization  suggests  fiscal austerity,  even recession. But that is not 
necessarily the case. Sargent  argues on rational  expectations grounds 
that price flexibility  would prevent persistent effects on real output.57 
Our  argument  is quite  different.  In a situation  of extreme  inflation,  fiscal 
stabilization  should  be considered  good news rather  than  a harbinger  of 
recession.58  In the special case where external  transfers  are suspended 
as part  of the reforms,  the presumption  of good news is even stronger. 
In a situation  of extreme inflation,  neither  external  nor internal  debt 
financing  of the  government  is available.  Current  inflation  taxes, negative 
real interest rates on assets, and payments  arrears  finance  the govern- 
ment. Stabilization  involves a shift away from the inflation  tax toward 
normal  taxation,  subsidy  cuts, and  expenditure  reduction.  Inflation  taxes 
are  just as much current  taxes as are income taxes; stabilization  does 
not involve shifting  taxes over time, as is the case with debt finance.  As 
a result,  except for  distributional  effects, real  demand  should  not change. 
This is not a consequence of Ricardian  equivalence, but rather an 
implication of the shift from an inflation tax to regular taxation.59 
Moreover, since extreme inflation  is highly distortionary,  the shift to 
normal  taxation  raises economywide  productivity.60 
A push  toward  recession could come from  the demand-side  effects of 
redistribution  that accompany the stabilization  program.  But, on bal- 
ance, the distributional  effects  seem to  run in the direction of an 
expansion: inflation is a highly regressive tax, so  stabilization may 
57. Sargent  (1982). See Wicker  (1986)  for evidence to the contrary,  in the case of 
Austria,  and  the discussion  in Eichengreen  (1986). 
58. See, for example,  Drazen  and  Helpman  (1988)  and  Liviatan  (1988). 
59. We differ here squarely  from Barro  (1990), who argues  that the evidence from 
Israel's  stabilization-a program  that  included  increased  public  saving  and  reduced  private 
saving-represents a textbook  case of Ricardian  equivalence. 
60. In addition,  there  may  be effects on real  investment.  These will depend  in part  on 
the extent to which real assets have been used as an inflation  hedge. Other  things  being 
equal,  stability  promotes  investment. 48  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1990 
actually  raise demand.  But if the correction  of the budget  deficit  elimi- 
nates subsidies  on food, transport,  and the like, the net change  for low- 
income  families  may be minor. 
However, stabilization  may  reduce  demand  in two ways. First, it may 
trim  public  sector employment.  While  in the long run  the corresponding 
reduction in taxation creates profit opportunities  that translate into 
higher employment, in the short run jobs are lost and this cuts into 
spending. Second, the financial sector also loses jobs.  This sector 
expands  in a high inflation  period  and takes a dramatic  downturn  when 
stabilization  occurs, which may account for some increased short-run 
unemployment. 
Stabilization  may well raise  aggregate  demand  through  an increase  in 
the purchasing  power of wages. This has been the case in Israel and 
Bolivia. Gains in the real wage can be explained  by the increase in the 
economies' productivity  that results from increased stability. Also, in 
extreme inflation,  firms  protect  themselves by charging  high  prices "in 
dollars," which correspondingly  reduces real wages. This effect is 
reversed  in the stabilization. 
When  to Stabilize? 
If stabilization were to occur when relative prices are seriously 
misaligned,  quick  results  could not be expected. Prices that  are too low 
in real terms would still need to rise, prices that are too high could be 
slow to fall. Therefore,  the inflation  performance  in the early aftermath 
of stabilization  would be obscured  by the relative  price  adjustments. 
A possible  response  to this  argument  is that  inflation  should  be allowed 
to reach hyperinflation  levels, because then synchronization  of prices 
on the exchange rate achieves the adjustment  of relative prices, an 
adjustment  that  is so elusive at more  moderate  levels of inflation.  Thus, 
it may  be argued  that  in a hyperinflation,  where  all prices  are set daily  or 
hourly with reference to the dollar, zero inflation can be achieved 
immediately  and  at little cost. 
This case for delaying stabilization  and waiting  for hyperinflation  is 
drastically  misleading  in several ways. First, relative  prices in a hyper- 
inflation  may  not  be those of a zero-inflation  economy.61  In  hyperinflation 
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situations,  the price level in dollars  can depart  by a substantial  margin 
from world  prices.62  Second, the move to hyperinflation  brings  about a 
loss ofgovernability  and  an  arbitrary  redistribution  of income  and  wealth. 
These may well lead to  serious political upheaval as  happened in 
Germany.63 
Another argument  for early stabilization  recognizes the hysteresis 
effects of extreme  inflation.  During  a hyperinflation,  tax administration 
and compliance  erode, financial  institutions  adapt, and pricing  shifts to 
a short horizon. Stabilization  may not reverse these changes for some 
time. Therefore,  stabilization  must be far more vigorous  if it occurs late 
in the game. 
It may be, however, that while sound economic arguments  can be 
made for early stabilization,  political  considerations  outweigh  them. A 
cure to the inflation  problem requires political consensus for, and a 
commitment  to, balancing  the budget. When inflation  is moderate  to 
high, budget balancing  is viewed as a negative sum game. Too many 
participants  feel that stabilization  is costly to them and  too few perceive 
that the reduction  in resource waste will more than cover their costs.M4 
Party  politics will dominate,  coalitions for disinflation  will be blocked, 
and inflation  stabilization  will not often succeed. Furthermore,  a series 
of temporary  stabilizations, often only the result of controls, lowers 
credibility  and  thus  raises  the difficulty  of stabilization  in the next round. 
According  to this view, it is better  to let inflation  escalate all the way. 
In a hyperinflation,  the disruption of normal economic life and the 
extravagant  cost of carrying  on business that are caused by extreme 
inflation  create the political basis for a national unity government  or 
emergency  powers, which would be the basis of a forceful and lasting 
stabilization. 
This line of argument  is more persuasive. But one must still ask at 
what stage should the stand be taken-at  30 percent per month, 50 
percent per month, or an extreme 1,000 percent per month? One can 
turn the argument  around  to say that stabilization  will not be accom- 
62. This is a reflection  either  of the flight  from  money, leading  to a decline in the real 
exchange  rate, or of a premium  on goods, leading  to prices  that are extravagantly  higher 
than  world  prices. 
63. See Fergusson  (1975)  and  Guttman  and  Meehan  (1975). 
64. Fernandez  and  Rodrik  (1990)  argue  that  the status  quo, as wasteful  as it is, has its 
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plished without deep reforms and that these cannot be accomplished 
without  broad  political  consensus. Policymakers  should  therefore  focus 
on getting  the necessary  political  support,  in the recognition  that "polit- 
ically impossible"  is the key phrase  accompanying  the progressive  slide 
into hyperinflation. 
Orthodox or Heterodox  Stabilization? 
The role of incomes policy-wage-price agreements  and freezes-in 
stabilization  programs  is the focus of vigorous debate. Such policies 
were used in Israel and Mexico's successful programs,  but they were 
also part of the failed programs  of Argentina,  Peru, and Brazil. In the 
successful Bolivian stabilization,  by contrast, incomes policy had no 
role, nor did it in the stabilizations  of the 1920s. 
Incomes policy enters the discussion because of the argument  that 
inflation  has  substantial  inertia.  This  inertia  stems  from  explicit  or  implicit 
indexation  in the environment  of high inflation  (but not hyperinflation). 
Moreover,  with staggered  price and wage adjustments  and an emphasis 
on restoring real price or wage relations when adjustments occur, 
inflation  has a momentum  almost  independent  of demand. 
Suppose now that money growth  were stopped, and assume for the 
sake of argument  that it were stopped "credibly." Would the end of 
monetary  expansion  signify  a rapid  reduction  in inflation  without  signif- 
icant unemployment?  Specifically, will economic agents abandon the 
backward-looking  indexation approach  to price and wage setting and 
spontaneously realign nominal prices to be consistent with the new 
monetary  policy and with equilibrium  in goods and  asset markets  under 
noninflationary  conditions?  There  is no case of a large  country  with high 
inflation  that stabilized  quickly  by simply  changing  the monetary-fiscal 
regime. In very small, open economies exchange rate stabilization  may 
cause rapid  transition.  But in large  economies with  a substantial  internal 
market,  the transition  is complicated. 
The absence of a particular  example  may only mean  that the belief in 
inertia  is so predominant  that  governments  are under  its spell. Or  it may 
mean that they have not tried because they feel they cannot make 
credible  commitments  and  hence fear  that  the  jump  to stability  may land 
them short. 
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surgery;  anesthetics  may  or may  not be used. In this analogy,  the change 
in the monetary-fiscal  regime  represents  the surgery  and  incomes  policy 
the anesthetic. Below we show various stabilization  experiences. In 
theory,  heterodox  programs  fall  into  the upper  left-hand  box; in  practice, 
they risk slipping  to the right. Orthodox  programs  fit squarely  into the 
lower left. 
Fiscal adjustment 
Yes  No 
Brazil 1986 
Yes  Israel 1985  Peru 1985-87 
Mexico 1988-90  Argentina  1985-89 
Incomes 
policy 
No  Bolivia 1985  Brazil 1989 
Clearly,  Peru, Brazil, and Argentina  used only the anesthetic, which 
provided temporary  relief. The operation never took place, and the 
disease, far from disappearing,  became more virulent. Bolivia, on the 
other hand, underwent  the operation-an  abrupt shift to a monetary 
target-but  declined the anesthetic.65  Mexico and Israel successfully 
reduced  inflation,  and did so without  a major  reduction  in real activity. 
They  both  used incomes  policy on an  equal  footing  with  fiscal  correction. 
Arguments  for  Heterodoxy 
There  are several basic reasons why incomes policy can accompany 
stabilization.66  First, until an economy has converged  to virtually  daily 
pricing  of goods and  labor,  some prices, wages, or contracts  will always 
be out of line. An example would be medium-term  contracts-a  few 
months long for debt, a year in some cases of rent. Incomes policy 
provides  an effective means  of realignment. 
Readjustment  is particularly  important  for debt contracts  that have 
maturities  of a few months. The sudden  drop  of inflation  in the context 
65. There  was some incomes policy used in that  union  leaders  were temporarily  sent 
into  exile. See Morales  (1988). 
66. For  arguments  concerning  heterodoxy  in  stabilization,  see Arida  and  Lara-Resende 
(1985),  Pereira  and  Nakano  (1987),  and  Dornbusch  and Simonsen  (1987).  Also see Shupp 
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of stabilization  would, in the absence of an imposed settlement, imply 
unusually  high realized  real interest rates that then drive some debtors 
into bankruptcy. 
The second argument  for incomes policy involves the coordination 
problem.  In the adjustment  to a new monetary  regime,  economic agents 
need to reset their prices. This resetting  brings into play expectations 
about  what  other  parties  think  and  how accommodating  the government 
might  be if something  goes wrong.  Economic  agents  are  likely  to respond 
by continuing  with price increases, triggering  the need for a demonstra- 
tion of policy determination.  The real issue is to stabilize at minimum 
cost. Incomes  policy-when  strictly  temporary  and  when  used  to accom- 
pany major  monetary  and fiscal adjustment-can help solve the coordi- 
nation  problem  by establishing  true  price stability. 
The third  argument  involves the budget. Where  high inflation  erodes 
real revenue  from  tax collection, stabilization  yields an immediate  gain 
in real revenue. Stabilization  also allows strictly temporary  monetiza- 
tion, which provides breathing space in which to deepen the fiscal 
reform.  This breathing  space also serves to accomplish  other important 
structural  reforms: in financial  markets, and in the area of exchange 
rates, where protection  will inevitably  be required.  The demonstration 
of actual price stability, after the trauma  of extreme inflation,  creates 
highly  favorable  political  conditions  that  can  serve  as the critical  stepping 
stone for achieving  these elusive reforms.  This  favorable  climate  carries 
a risk as well-with  the alarm bells switched off, governments can 
become complacent. 
Before considering  the arguments  against incomes policy, we note 
some implications  of the simulation  model  discussed  earlier.  This model 
gives strong  support  to incomes policy as a coordinating  device accom- 
panying  a fiscal  correction.  Once  an increase  in government  expenditure 
has shifted  the economy to a new inflationary  path, a return  to the initial 
level of expenditure  will not return  the economy to zero inflation.  The 
budget  will remain  in deficit  due to the inflation-induced  reduction  in real 
revenue.  Thus, successful  stabilization  requires  fiscal  overshooting.  The 
fiscal  correction  must  be sufficient  to eradicate  the inflationary  momen- 
tum of the economy. Only after zero inflation  has been achieved can 
fiscal expenditure  return  to its initial level without inflationary  conse- 
quences. 
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freezes that reduce the cost of stabilization. A temporary price and wage 
freeze, imposed at the moment of stabilization, increases real tax receipts 
and thereby  reduces  the extent  of budgetary correction  needed  for a 
return to the zero-inflation steady state. 
The Counterargument 
Opponents of incomes  policy  argue that it detracts from the central 
focus of a stabilization, namely the change of regime. Incomes policies 
may obscure the extent to which a regime change has occurred. Or, they 
may carry forward the need for adjustments in relative prices,  which 
would be better resolved immediately so that they do not become sources 
of  renewed  inflationary expectations.  Or, finally,  incomes  policy,  by 
suppressing the symptoms, may undermine the very willingness to attack 
the disease at the roots. 
Noting the cycles  of open and repressed inflation in Brazil, as shown 
in figure 7, Miguel Kiguel and Nissan Liviatan conclude strongly against 
the use of incomes policy.67 
Until there is sufficient resolve to deal with inflation (and pay the cost of 
disinflation)  there  is no way in which the inflationary  trend  could be reversed  in 
each of these countries.  However, much  of the excessive instability  could have 
been prevented by avoiding the repeated use of incomes policies.  .  .  . Given the 
recurrent  failures  during  the cycles period  there is no possibility  in the present 
situation  of avoiding  the confrontation  between  pessimistic  expectations  and  the 
effort  to  set  nominal  anchors....  Further use  of  price  controls  should  be 
avoided  in order  to restore  credibility  in conventional  anchors. 
With each  round of  failed  stabilization,  the  case  against  heterodoxy 
becomes stronger. In fact, even the temporary results can be questioned. 
The results may primarily reflect a cycle  where a freeze  is anticipated, 
which leads to precautionary increases in list prices. Accordingly,  there 
is an appearance, in the early phase of a freeze,  of low inflation that in 
reality only  represents  temporarily low  transactions  prices.  Figure  8 
strongly bears out this phenomenon for the case of Argentina. 
Thus, the counterargument centers squarely on the need to establish 
a credibility in a new monetary regime that can serve as an anchor.68 
67. Kiguel  and  Liviathan  (1990a,  pp. 32-33). 
68. On  the  issue  of credibility  see Barro  and  Gordon  (1983),  and  the  reviews  by Persson 
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Figure 7.  Inflation during Brazil's Stabilization Plans,  1984-90a 
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Source:  Authors'  own  adaptation from Cardoso (forthcoming) using data from Internationial Financial  Statistics, 
various issues. 
a.  The four inflation stabilization plans have been the Cruzado plan (January 1986), the Bresser  plan (May  1987), 
the Summer plan (December  1988), and the Collor plain (April 1990). 
b.  The inflation measure is a three-month moving average. 
Credibility: What Is Enough? 
Some theoretical work on stabilization centers on the notion of 
credibility and on the need to establish this credibility  by a decisive 
regime  change. Without  questioning  the broad  notion of credibility,  we 
qualify  how much  can be expected from  it. 
Credibility  is overrated  as a  concept. One  government  cannot  establish 
permanent  conditions:  the next government  could make a U-turn, the 
current  government  may even find  it convenient  to do so. 
In  practice,  the public  lives with  the actual  facts and  does not speculate 
much  about  whether  a current  stabilization  will last a year or forever. It 
is near-term  credibility  that matters-can the exchange  rate  be held and 
will high interest rates persist? In Germany's 1923 stabilization, for 
example,  inflation  was stopped  by budget  control  and  supertight  money, Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  55 
Figure 8.  Argentina: Response of List Prices to Price Freezes,  1986-9Oa 
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Source:  Unpublished  data from Fraga and Associates  Consulting Firm, Buenos  Aires. 
a.  The ratio of list prices to transaction prices is shown.  Vertical lines correspond to price freezes. 
even though month after month expectations of stabilization  were at 
best precarious.69  Similarly  in Israel's stabilization,  doubts about me- 
dium-term  success continued to be voiced months after inflation  had 
already  come down. 
Institutional change is  often emphasized as  a key ingredient in 
establishing  credibility;  a move to gold or the introduction  of an inde- 
pendent  central  bank are specific examples.70 Although  the creation  of 
an independent  central bank would be a crucial step,71 a government 
that  is unwilling  to balance  the budget  is hardly  likely  to do so. Attention 
should,  therefore,  focus more  on the budget  and  less on the central  bank 
69. See Webb  (1989),  Eichengreen  (1986),  Siklos  (1990),  and  Dornbusch  (1987). 
70. See Republic  of Poland  (1926). 
71. Chile,  for example,  has  just made  its central  bank  independent  and New Zealand 
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arrangements.  If the budget  is not balanced,  the government  will create 
some  kind  of money.72 
Credibility  is best established  by pervasive fiscal reform:  putting  in 
place a tax system that collects revenue from a broad tax base with 
moderate  tax rates, and enforcing  the law fiercely. In Argentina,  for 
example, if ten million  people rather  than  three thousand  were made  to 
pay taxes, the fiscal  problem  would not exist. The auditing  of one out of 
every ten high income people in Mexico, for example, has established 
an infrastructure  of lasting  fiscal stability. 
Thoroughgoing  fiscal reform,  both with respect to the tax base and 
tax administration,  is important  because it protects  against  shocks. With 
a broad  tax base and  an indexed  tax system, shocks to the budget  can be 
met by small changes in marginal  taxes. Without those safeguards, 
inflationary  finance  is the automatic  response. 
,External  support  has a special role to play in stabilization,  especially 
as it affects  credibility.  While  certain  IMF  programs,  like  incomes  policy, 
have lost their glamour  after much failure, external measures  can still 
contribute in two critical ways.  First, external parties can monitor 
programs  when credit  is linked  to performance.  Austria  and Hungary  in 
the 1920s  had  such an  arrangement  with  the League  of Nations. Resident 
commissars reinforced  discipline and watched the budget daily. Tax 
reform  was a precondition  for stabilization  loans, and the commissar 
could deny approval  of spending  projects.73  The United States played  a 
monitoring  role in the case of Israel's stabilization. 
Second, external support  can provide the foreign exchange that is 
essential for exchange rate stabilization. The availability of foreign 
exchange  reserves  raises  the backing  of domestic  money, thus  improving 
confidence.  Coupled  with a balanced  budget,  foreign  exchange  backing 
represents  strong  support  for an anti-inflation  program.  Foreign  support 
can take different forms including the acceptance of suspension of 
resource  transfers.  For both Germany  and  Bolivia, this was a precondi- 
tion for stabilization.74 
72. In Poland  in the 1920s,  following  the introduction  of an independent  central  bank, 
there was another  inflation  based on the Treasury's  residual  right to mint coins! See 
Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1986). 
73. See League  of Nations  (1926a,  1926b). 
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Whether  external  support  is decisive or not is open to question. The 
League of Nations did arrive at a clear-cut conclusion, arguing  that 
"loans and credit  from abroad  were neither  sufficient  by themselves to 
bring  about effective stability, nor were they always necessary to that 
end."75  But in the 1920s,  and  later  in Bolivia and  Israel, the importance 
of foreign  support  is not in question. Although  the central  action has to 
be fiscal  and  monetary  reform,  foreign  financial  support  helps  to mobilize 
confidence  and  to encourage  repatriation  of capital  flight.  Thus, external 
support  critically  eases the adjustment. 
Nominal  Anchors 
A final  question  concerns the choice of nominal  anchors. Should  the 
central bank define its policy in terms of an exchange rate rule, a 
monetary  target,  or some combination?76 
If inflation  were to stop abruptly,  without  a fall in the price level and 
without an increase in real balances, the real money supply would 
continue at its low level. Faced with conditions left by the preceding 
high inflation,  the government  can either bring  interest rates down by 
monetary  expansion, given the price level, or it can contain nominal 
money growth  and  force a reduction  in the price level through  currency 
appreciation  and  the threat  of recession. 
A  monetary expansion could take place by either financing the 
government  or monetizing  foreign  exchange inflows. The high nominal 
interest rate reverses previous capital flight, or dollarization.  In sup- 
porting  a given exchange  rate, the central  bank  could simply  remonetize 
the economy with a marginal  reserve backing of 100 percent. In this 
setting, real money would gradually  rise and real interest rates fall. A 
fixed exchange rate is an attractive option in that it establishes an 
immediate  focal point for coordinating  price expectations and price 
setting. Moreover, if confidence is strong and, as a result, capital is 
substantially  mobile, remonetization  will occur in good time. As shown 
in equation 10, the private sector surplus  would become a channel of 
remonetization. 
75. League  of Nations  (1946,  p. 13  1). 
76. See Dornbusch  (1982) and Fischer (1988) on the issue of exchange rate and 
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The risk  of a strategy  based on exchange  rates  comes from  the side of 
inflation. If prices do not stop rising shortly after rates are fixed, 
progressive overvaluation develops.  In turn, overvaluation creates 
expectations of devaluation. To avoid this problem, exchange rates 
should  be fixed at the outset, but soon after should switch to a crawling 
peg in order  to maintain  the real exchange  rate. This measure  increases 
inflationary  pressure  in the economy and  therefore  shifts  more  weight  to 
the budget  as the central  stabilizing  force. Overvaluation  notwithstand- 
ing, to advocate a fixed exchange rate, with the idea that the resulting 
recession would teach price setters a lesson, is risky. It may fail on 
political  grounds. 
An important  caveat must be made with respect to the financing  of 
reserve acquisition.  Again equation 10 is helpful. One view holds that 
monetization of reserve flows cannot be problematic  because of the 
marginal  100 percent backing;  in case of capital outflows, the central 
bank can readily  buy back the domestic money stock. However, if the 
central bank in the foreign exchange market monetizes the foreign 
exchange counterpart  of trade surpluses,  there may be trouble. Mone- 
tizing  trade  surpluses  is just as inflationary  as building  monuments  with 
central bank credit. The continuing  inflation  in Argentina  can be ex- 
plained  by the fact that  the budget  surplus  is not large  enough  to sterilize 
the effect of foreign exchange purchases on the money supply, which 
arise from  the private  sector trade  surplus. 
It is true that when foreign exchange operations correspond  to an 
accommodation  of a portfolio shift from foreign to domestic money, 
intervention  and monetization  have no inflationary  impact. But when 
the foreign  exchange  purchases  correspond  to trade  surpluses,  that  logic 
no longer applies. For example, when a government  with a balanced 
budget depreciates the exchange rate at a given rate, the public will 
anticipate  inflation  and inflation  will in fact emerge  (or continue).  Thus, 
the public pays an inflation  tax, except that in this case it finances the 
acquisition  of reserves rather  than  the budget. 
An alternative  strategy  centers on monetary  control. The exchange 
rate  would  be allowed  to fluctuate  freely. Under  this  policy, an  immediate 
overvaluation may occur due to high interest rates and momentary 
confidence.  The  overvaluation  increases  the risk  of a deep  and  protracted 
recession,  which  would  directly  undermine  the fiscal  stabilization  through 
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Damned  If  You Do,  Damned  If  You Don't? 
In the most recent stabilization efforts of Argentina and Brazil, 
incomes policy has no part. This time around  policymakers  insist that 
fiscal  and  monetary  control, rather  than  incomes policy, are the keys to 
controlling  inflation.  Budgets, on a cash basis, have been balanced  and 
monetary  control (after remonetization)  is in place. Even so,, inflation 
has not vanished. In fact, with weekly adjustments  in prices widely 
reported,  a new inertia  has trapped  the economies at unacceptably  high 
inflation  rates. 
The predicament  of Brazil and Argentina  today is that cash budget 
surpluses  have not been enough  to stop inflation.  Inertia  is so pervasive 
(and  the cut in the real  wage already  so large)  that  the state of recession 
does not readily  produce  further  reductions  in the inflation  rate. Credi- 
bility works to contain the current  inflation  until further  notice, but it 
does not produce a disinflation  without the actual demonstration  of 
deeper recession. That showdown still lies ahead and depends on the 
resolve  of the central  bank  to control  money growth  fully. 
The Argentine  and Brazilian  governments  now face a choice. One 
strategy  is to add incomes policy to the already  changed  monetary  and 
fiscal  regime.  The combination  could help  bring  inflation  down to single- 
digit  levels. The alternative  is to further  tighten  fiscal restraint-prefer- 
ably  by deepening  reforms  rather  than  by emergency  measures-and to 
harden  the restraint  on nominal money growth even if that means a 
strongly  overvalued  real  exchange  rate.  The  resulting  decline  in activity, 
if large enough, would ultimately  yield lower inflation.  This approach 
would  need  to be pursued  over  a few months,  possibly  longer.  In  deciding 
which alternative  to use, governments  must consider certain factors. 
First, the introduction  of incomes policy is unattractive  because it 
connotes  failure  and may be counterproductive  with respect to expec- 
tations. Second, the alternative  strategy  of further  tightening  is costly, 
both economically and politically, and in the end may fail because 
credibility  in the political  scenario  could break  down. 
Not even the prospect  of reestablishing  credibility  through  a deep and 
long recession is plausible  because democratic  governments  and their 
policies are not exogenous and cannot be precommitted.  Through  the 
backdoor  comes incomes policy, with all its bad reputation,  because it 
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A radical alternative, for countries like Argentina or Peru whose 
governments  are administratively  and politically weak, is adoption of 
the dollar  as a national  currency. Seigniorage  aside, if the budget  were 
balanced, such a move might  dramatically  lower the costs of transition 
to a low inflation  that lasts. Although  the loss of seigniorage  must be 
taken seriously, it can be overcome.77  Argentina  is already  almost  fully 
dollarized.  Unless people  expect stabilization  to be accomplished  quickly 
and effectively, bringing with it a de-dollarization, the seigniorage 
argument  does not stand  up. As illustrated  in table 14, Bolivia's contin- 
uing  dollarization  serves as an example.  The public  already  holds a large 
portion  of its transactions  balances  in U.S. dollars;  local money serves 
only as small  change. In the banking  system, dollarization  is advancing 
because it is the only plausible,  safe way of intermediating  on shore. 
The decisive step would  be to prohibit  any further  domestic  currency 
issue, which would allow the existing stock of domestic currency to 
serve the transactions  needs. The entire banking  system should be put 
on a dollar basis, thus facilitating  a resumption  of intermediation  that 
can help ease the adjustment  process. 
It stands to reason that Argentina,  with a 20-year  history of extreme 
instability,  may have a brighter  future without a national  money. This 
may  be the lowest cost strategy  to overcome stubborn  expectations.  The 
same  argument  applies  to Peru,  where  dollarization  is already  well along. 
Indeed,  the distance  to full  dollarization  is much  shorter  than  the distance 
back to a sound  national  money. 
Concluding Remarks 
After briefly  summarizing  a number  of our findings,  we comment  on 
a critical  direction  of research.  High  inflation  is an intrinsically  unstable 
process; the more  inflation  a country  has, the more  inevitably  it is drawn 
into rapidly  accelerating  price  increases. Also, high  inflation  is a process 
that  involves an endogenous  money supply  in a critical  way. The budget 
deficit  increases  as a result  of high  inflation  due to the erosion of real  tax 
revenue and the lags in adjusting  public  sector prices. The frequency  of 
77.  Fischer (1982). Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  61 
Table 14.  Money Holding in Bolivia,  198O.9Oa 
Percent 
Time  deposits 
Held in  Held in 
Sight  national  U.S. 
Year  Currency  deposits  currency  dollars 
1980  41.0  20.7  26.0  12.3 
1984  72.0  10.7  17.1  2.6 
1986  35.8  8.4  20.5  31.0 
1989  22.3  9.2  5.3  57.3 
1990b  17.4  8.7  4.5  63.4 
Source:  Banco Central de Bolivia,  Boletin Estadistico  265:14 (March 1990). 
a.  Numbers represent the average  percent of M2 held in a specific form. 
b.  The  1990 numbers are for March only. 
price  adjustment  for  goods and  labor  responds  to the rate  of inflation  and 
in turn  feeds the acceleration  of inflation. 
Furthermore,  the financial  system adapts  pervasively  to high  inflation 
and so erodes the scope for noninflationary  seigniorage. When the 
system fails to adapt, radical dollarization  is the consequence. Real 
exchange  rate collapse plays a central  role in initiating  and propagating 
high  inflation.  In  addition,  there  can  be no stabilization  without  monetary 
control.  Monetary  control requires  budget  balancing  to an extent suffi- 
cient to include even the exchange purchase associated with a fixed 
exchange  rate in the presence of trade surpluses.  Also, incomes policy 
can  play a critical  role in achieving  the transition  to low inflation,  but it 
cannot be a substitute for fiscal control. Credibility  is best built by 
institutional  reform  in the public  sector. This means  tax and  expenditure 
reform.  Finally,  external  support  is a critical  ingredient  for stabilization; 
it helps mobilize confidence and thus offsets, at least partially, the 
fragility  of a post-hyperinflation  economy. 
Two main  puzzles emerge  from our study of extreme inflation.  The 
pricing  of goods does speed up in response to high inflation,  and can 
even reach hourly frequency in extremes. Yet,  the acceleration is 
surprisingly  slow. The sluggish  response is even more apparent  in the 
reluctance  to automatically  adapt  wages to current  inflation.  The sticki- 
ness of payment  intervals  for labor  services is equally  puzzling.  A richer 
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Also, the pervasiveness  of U-turns  in macroeconomic  policy begs for 
a political  model. Why  do governments  make  U-turns,  inflating  one day 
freely and staging a violent anti-inflation  policy the next? A central 
finding  in  a review  of a large  number  of stabilizations  is the corresponding 
change in the political scene: the trauma  of extreme inflation  brings 
national  unity  governments  or governments  that  enjoy emergency  pow- 
ers. This was as true  for Germany,  Austria,  and France  in the 1920s  as 
it was for Israel in the 1980s. In the end, the dynamics  of this political 
consensus remain  as an important  issue for further  study. 
APPENDIX 
The Simulation Model 
OUR MODEL  is an extended version of Olivier  Blanchard  and Nobuhiro 
Kiyotaki's 1987  model and introduces  inflation,  elastic money demand, 
and  endogenous  money growth.  Money is derived  from  the government 
budget  constraint  that  includes  a Tanzi  effect. 
The economy is composed  of a finite  number  of consumer-producers 
who maximize  an intertemporal  utility  function  defined  over consump- 
tion, real monetary  balances, and labor effort. We use three agents in 
our simulation.  They maximize: 
(Al)  Ui =  f[(Cilg)9  MI(P(1  -  g))  g  -  (0/1) PY]e  t dt, 
where all variables  are functions of time. Ci is a constant elasticity of 
substitution  (CES) index of commodities and P is the corresponding 
price  index. Each  individual  must  decide  on consumption,  real  monetary 
holdings, and production.  Each agent faces the following budget con- 
straints,  over all  j goods: 
(A2)  >P1Cji  +  M,  =  PiY + M,  t-I  -  P-yQ7, 
that is, consumption  plus nominal  balances equals income plus money 
holdings in the previous period minus taxes. Taxes, represented  by a 
function y, fall with inflation  so that y' < 0. This function  is arbitrarily 
imposed  in the model. 
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both with taxes and money creation. The budget constraint of the 
government  is 
(A3)  PCg  = AM +  Py(IT), 
where Cg  denotes government  consumption.  Solving the maximization 
problem  for  the consumer,  we find  that  velocity is a function  of inflation.78 
We also obtain  a demand  function  for each commodity  as the sum of the 
individual  demands  of each agent. This demand  function  is a function  of 
the relative  price  of the firm  and  of aggregate  real monetary  balances. 
Each individual determines her optimal price by maximizing an 
indirect utility function, having been given the optimal choices of 
consumption  and money  holdings  and  the economywide  demand  for her 
product. We do not impose the restriction  that each firm  is small and 
that changes in individual  prices do not affect the general  price level. If 
there exist different  groups with homogenous "menu costs," they will 
behave similarly-a  fact that is anticipated  by firms and has discrete 
effects on the price level. This makes the maximization  problem  quite 
complicated; the general equilibrium  price level is solved from the 
nonlinear  solution  to the three  first-order  conditions  for each individual 
firm.  The equilibrium  price level is a function  of the overall quantity  of 
money in the economy. 
We  assume  initially  that  with  zero inflation  taxes are  enough  to finance 
government  spending.  Thus,  we generate  an  equilibrium  for  the  economy 
where inflation  is zero and money does not grow. We then introduce 
fiscal shocks by increasing  government  spending.  The primary  deficit  is 
financed  by printing  money. The increase  in money raises  the individual 
demands, thereby increasing the optimal price for each consumer- 
producer. Eventually some firm (depending  on its exogenous cost of 
changing  prices)  finds  it desirable  to change  its price. 
Adjustments  by this first  firm  may then trigger  adjustments  by other 
firms,  since goods are substitutes.  Eventually  the economy settles into 
a Nash equilibrium  for the period, where no firm  wants to change its 
price  given  the prices  of the other  two. The higher  equilibrium  price  level 
affects  the budget  constraint  of the government  in two ways: it increases 
nominal  government  spending  and reduces government  revenue. Both 
effects require  an increase in the quantity  of money in order  to finance 
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its primary  deficit, thereby triggering  a new round  of adjustments.  The 
final solution (for the period) is reached when no further  adjustment 
takes place. More formally,  the following iterative  algorithm  is solved 
in every period:79 
Step one.  Given an initial  value for P,  determine  current  money M, 
from  equation  A3. 
Step two. For each producer,  determine  whether an increase in her 
price is optinmal,  keeping  the remaining  prices at their  original  values. 
Step three. If at least one producer  adjusts under step two, change 
those prices to their  new optimal  level. Recalculate  whether  adjustment 
has become optimal  for the remaining  producers. 
Step  four.  If at  least  one  producer  adjusts  under  step  three,  recalculate 
the optimal  prices for the producers  that had adjusted  under step two. 
Using these new prices, repeat  from  step three. 
Step  five. Using the individual  prices obtained, calculate  the overall 
price level. If this level differs from the initial  guess by more than 0.1 
percent, repeat  from  step one. 
79. Gauss  computer  programs  for the model  are  available  upon  request. Comments 
and Discussion 
StanleyFischer: This  is an  excellentpaper,  with  an  eminently  believable 
story line and much exciting detail. The authors  document  a number  of 
destabilizing  mechanisms  that gradually  appear  in high inflation  econ- 
omies, including the Tanzi effect, the indexation of labor and other 
contracts, the shortening  of price and wage adjustment  lags, financial 
innovations,  and some aspects of exchange  rate  behavior. 
The basic argument  must be that once inflation  reaches a certain 
range,  it tends to continue  rising  unless definite  action  is taken  to stop it. 
The sensitivity  of the inflation  rate  to small  shocks probably  results  from 
holding  the deficit  constant  and  working  with seigniorage  as the residual 
source of financing.  Under these conditions, with a seigniorage  Laffer 
curve, small  changes  in  revenue  requirements  can  generate  large  changes 
in inflation.  Although  the authors are rightly confident that exchange 
rate dynamics play an important  role in the inflationary  process, the 
exchange  rate is not fully embodied  in the theoretical  apparatus. 
The conclusions on most controversial  issues have the ring  of truth 
and sense. For instance, the authors  are surely right  to emphasize  that 
most  rapid  inflations  are  not the result  of an  error-free  optimizing  process 
by the government,  but rather  reflect government  mistakes and weak- 
ness-for  example,  the view, popular  in both  Brazil  and  Israel,  that  each 
country  had learned  to live with inflation  through  extensive indexation. 
Of course, emphasis on government errors pushes the analysis of 
hyperinflation  back  a step to the questions  of why governments  are  weak 
and why they make mistakes-but  pushing the problem toward its 
fundamentals  is progress  in its own right. 
Second, the conclusions on heterodox policies are right. The paper 
clearly  sets out the two views about heterodox policies: first that they 
reduce the transitional  costs of stabilization;  and alternatively, that 
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incomes policies should not be used to try to reduce the transitional 
costs of stabilization  because they allow the government to reduce 
inflation  without  addressing  the fundamental  fiscal issue and thus doom 
the stabilization  attempt. This latter view is for obvious reasons now 
popular  in Brazil  and  Argentina. 
Both arguments  may  be relevant.  The heterodox  component  was key 
in persuading  the Israeli government  to stabilize. For a long time, the 
fear of a massive recession had stood between the government  and a 
stabilization  program.  The government  was finally  moved  to stabilize  by 
the argument  that  wage and  price  controls  would  enable  the economy to 
move rapidly  to the new noninflationary  equilibrium  without  generating 
much  unemployment.  Despite the authors'  opinion  of the strength  of the 
national  unity government  in Israel, I do not believe that it would have 
acted in 1985  if it had  believed a major  recession would follow. 
Incidentally, to expand on the Israeli case, the reason behind the 
importance  of heterodoxy-the  government's  unwillingness  to confront 
labor-also  helps account for subsequent slow growth. The Israeli 
government  started  out with a tough program  that cut real wages. But 
after the early success of the stabilization,  wages were allowed to rise 
rapidly.  Within  six months, the average  wage was back to its prestabili- 
zation level-and  the high real wage helps account for slow growth in 
the next three  years. 
Third,  the paper  makes an important  point in arguing  that a policy of 
printing  money only to monetize the current  account surplus  will not 
necessarily prevent inflation.  The Humeian adjustment  process must 
work in the long run. But there is no theory to show that a current 
account surplus  generates  the correct  growth  rate of money in a stabili- 
zation. There  are cases, such as Argentina  at present, where that  policy 
has not stopped  inflation. 
Let me also raise  a few points  on which  I may  differ  from  the emphasis 
of the authors.  First, although  I agree  that  credibility  operates  much  like 
a deus ex machina in many models, one wonders occasionally, when 
studying  stabilization  attempts, what distinguishes  the successful from 
the unsuccessful. When  Rudi  Dornbusch  and I studied  the stabilization 
attempts of  the  1920s, we  found it difficult to  tell  ex ante which 
stabilizations  would work and which wouldn't-and  at least one of the 
co-authors  had a sense that credibility  was involved. Certainly  models 
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No one can doubt  that  some policymakers  have credibility  and  others 
don't:  the Bundesbank  has it, and the Banco Central  de Argentina  does 
not. The authors  must be arguing  that credibility  does not change  fast, 
that policymakers  have to earn credibility through a long record of 
consistent  behavior,  and that stabilizations  are therefore  unlikely  to be 
assisted  by a sudden  onrush  of credibility. 
Second,  those who argue  that  it might  be wise to wait  for  hyperinflation 
before stabilizing are-or  should be-making  a political and not an 
economic  argument.  The point is not that relative  prices are more  likely 
to be right  when  the inflation  rate  is higher  but  that  politicians  are  unlikely 
to move until the public is fully persuaded  that the costs of inflation 
outweigh  the costs of stabilizing.  That  may be wise economically  since 
it enables  the policymakers  to persist  longer  with a tougher  policy when 
the costs of stabilization  begin  to appear. 
A third point of contention concerns dollarization.  There may be 
countries,  such as Peru  and Argentina,  where that  is the only remaining 
possibility. But there is bound  to be tremendous  political  opposition  to 
dollarization,  on the grounds  that  using a foreign  money derogates  from 
the country's sovereignty. That was the argument that forced the 
resignation  of the finance  minister  in Israel  who proposed  dollarization 
to the Knesset in 1983.  It has also to be recognized  that dollarization  is 
a tough way of stabilizing.  A dollarizing  government  denies itself the 
advantage  of printing  money  during  the remonetization  that  accompanies 
the early stage of a stabilization program. Fiscal policy has to be 
correspondingly  tighter  than  it would otherwise  have been. 
Let me turn finally to some puzzles that remain  even after reading 
this paper- 
Under what circumstances  do countries degenerate  into hyperinfla- 
tion? The  -paper  suggests that hyperinflations  occur in countries with 
socially and politically divided populations, and weak governments. 
That  is true for Peru, Argentina,  Brazil, and Yugoslavia.  It was less so 
in Israel. Further work should clarify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  The weak French  governments  of the 1950s,  and  the contin- 
uing weakness of Italian  governments, have not produced  hyperinfla- 
tions. The strength  of the central  bank  and the civil service must play a 
role;  other  factors  are no doubt  important  too. 
Is there any role for the notion that mistaken policy rules lead 
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rate  constant,  or holding  the nominal  exchange  rate  constant,  have done 
their  share  in some hyperinflations. 
Is there any point at which extreme inflation  becomes inevitable?  Is 
Colombia,  with its stable 20 percent  annual  inflation,  destined  to hyper- 
inflate?  I don't know. 
Why does the inflationary  process appear  to be asymmetric?  Why, 
when inflation  reaches the high  double digits, are all  jumps upward-or 
is that  just a selection bias, in which we study the cases in which  jumps 
have been upward? Why don't the mechanisms that speed up the 
inflationary  response to adverse shocks speed up the deflationary  re- 
sponse to beneficial  shocks? 
Why  don't gradualist  stabilizations  work? 
Is it ever the case that all it takes to stabilize is to fix the exchange 
rate,  or some other  nominal  variable,  without  changing  the fiscal  deficit? 
The  Tanzi  effect makes  this  theoretically  possible;  it may  have happened 
in Yugoslavia at the beginning of this year-although  the Yugoslav 
stabilization  is now in severe trouble-and in Italy in 1947. 
Do governments  ever hyperinflate  deliberately?  This claim  has been 
made for both the German and Russian hyperinflations  of the early 
1920s. 
Finally,  is the central  role  of seigniorage  in modern  models  of inflation 
convincing? Seigniorage  rarely amounts to more than 3-4 percent of 
GNP, and  is frequently  a much  smaller  share. Our  models say that is all 
that is driving  the inflation,  that inflation  would disappear  if the deficit 
were cut by that amount. The logic is impeccable. But that is a very 
small  tail to wag such a big dog. 
Robert J.  Barro: Rudiger Dornbusch, Federico Sturzenegger, and 
Holger  Wolf s paper  stresses that  inflation  interacts  in several  ways with 
real phenomena, such as the government's budget, the operation of 
financial  markets,  and  wage  determination.  Thus,  an  immediate  question 
is how significant  the link is between real performance  and the amount 
and variability  of inflation.  To explore this issue, I have examined  the 
relationship  between  inflation  and  the growth  rate  of real  per  capita  GDP 
from 1970-85 in a cross section of 117 countries. Figure 1 reveals a 
negative  but  weak  relation  between  the GDP  growth  rate  and  the average 
inflation  rate  from 1970-85;  the correlation  is -0.19.  Figure  2 reveals a 
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variation  in inflation.  In this case, the correlation  for 108 countries is 
- 0.20. (The highest coefficient of variation  is 2.50 for Oman. Because 
Oman  maintained  a fixed exchange rate with the U.S.  dollar in most 
years, the Omani  price  level is basically  the U.S. dollar  price of oil.) 
Figure 3 shows the relation  between the GDP growth rate and the 
change in the inflation  rate, measured  by the average rate for 1970-85 
less the average rate for 1960-70. The correlation  for 114 countries is 
-0.25,  but is dominated by some extreme observations: the sharp 
reduction  in the inflation  rate for Indonesia  and the sharp  increases for 
Argentina,  Bolivia, Israel, Chile, Uganda,  and Peru.  Figure  4 shows the 
pattern  when  the extreme  values are  deleted. In this case, the correlation 
for the remaining  107  countries  is a weaker - 0.16. 
I added  the measures  of inflation  intensity  to a growth-rate  regression 
of the type that I estimated in a previous study for 98 countries.' The 
dependent  variable  is the growth  rate of real per capita  GDP from 1970 
to 1985.  The independent  variables  are the level of real per capita  GDP 
in 1960, school enrollment  rates in 1960  (a measure  of human  capital), 
the share of GDP from 1970-85 taken by government consumption 
purchases,  and other  variables  that measure  political  stability  and  price 
distortions.  In this setting, the inflation  variable  that  matters  most is the 
change in the inflation  rate from 1960-70 to 1970-85. The estimated 
coefficient, - 0.033, with a standard  error  of 0.012 and t-statistic  of 2.7, 
indicates  that an increase of 10  percentage  points in the inflation  rate is 
associated  with a 0.3 percentage  point  reduction  in the per  capita  growth 
rate. When  this inflation  variable  is included,  the two other  measures  of 
the intensity  of inflation-the average  inflation  rate  for 1970-85  and the 
coefficient of  variation of  inflation over  1970-85-are  insignificant, 
whereas  the change  in the inflation  rate still has a t-statistic  of 1.7. 
My inference  is that real economic performance  is significantly  and 
inversely related to an intensification  of inflation,  although  the differ- 
ences in the behavior  of inflation  account  for only a small  fraction  of the 
cross-country  variations  in  growth  rates.  Moreover,  much  of the negative 
relation  likely  reflects  the symptomatic  nature  of inflation;  countries  that 
do badly for other reasons also tend to experience a worsening of 
inflation. 
If inflation  is viewed as a distortion of private choices, then the 
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relatively  minor  role of inflation  in real performance  is not surprising. 
Many  policies that  governments  engineer-such  as quotas  and prohibi- 
tive tariffs, high marginal  tax rates, licensing requirements  and other 
business regulations,  and expropriations  of property-represent more 
substantial  distortions. (Only minor parts of these effects are held 
constant  in the above regressions.)  It is also true  that some of the worst 
performers,  in terms of economic growth, do not have especially bad 
inflation.  For  example,  for  39  sub-Saharan  African  countries,  the average 
growth rate of real per capita GDP between 1970 and 1985 was 0.1 
percent, compared to 2.0 percent for 75 other countries. The mean 
inflation  rate for the African countries over the same period was 12.3 
percent  (the median  was 9.8 percent), and  the mean  increase  in inflation 
from 1960 to 1970 was 7.8 percent (the median was 6.5 percent). In 
contrast,  for 75 other  countries,  the mean  inflation  rate  was 15.8  percent 
(median,  9.6 percent)  and  the mean  increase  in inflation  was 9.5 percent 
(median,  6.6 percent). 
A common confusion in the discussion of inflation  is the meaning  of 
the term "budget deficit." A government's real sources of revenue 
include  conventional  real  taxes (the  amount  of which may  be influenced, 
as the authors  stress, by actual  and anticipated  inflation),  the change  in 
the real  value  of the government's  interest-bearing  debt, and  the revenue 
from  printing  high-powered  money.2  The revenue  from money creation 
can, in turn, be divided into the part  associated with expected inflation 
and the part  associated with inflation  surprises.  The first  amounts  to an 
excise tax on the holding  of money and the second to a capital  levy on 
money. A  capital-levy term could also be  separated out from the 
conventional  real  taxes. 
For a given path  of real spending  and  in the absence of default  on the 
debt  (which  includes  reductions  in the real  value  of nominal  debt  through 
unexpected inflation), an increase in the real, interest-bearing  debt 
implies  a corresponding  increase  in  the real  present  value  of conventional 
taxes plus  the inflation  tax. (The  exact correspondence  applies  if govern- 
ment  and  private  interest  rates are the same and  if Ponzi  games with the 
2. The real sources of revenue balance  the real uses of revenue  if the government's 
interest  payments  are calculated  with  the real  interest  rate  rather  than  the nominal  rate. I 
assume  for  convenience  that  the government  does not hold  assets, such  as buildings,  land, 
gold,  and  financial  claims.  Otherwise,  the real  value  of these items  would  ideally  be netted 
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debt are infeasible.) Thus, it is natural  to define the real deficit as the 
change  in  the real  debt  or, equivalently,  to include  an  inflation  adjustment 
in the computation  of the budget  deficit.  The real  deficit  defined  this way 
has intertemporal  implications;  namely, a larger  real deficit means that 
the government's  tax collections, including  the inflation  tax, shift from 
the present  to the future.3 
The authors' discussion conflicts with this view when it refers to 
financing  a "deficit"  by printing  money. At a later  point  in their  analysis, 
however, they argue, "Inflation  taxes are  just as much  current  taxes as 
are income taxes; stabilization  [of inflation]  does not involve shifting 
taxes  over time,  as is the case  with debt finance.  As a result . . . real 
demand should not change. This is not a consequence of Ricardian 
equivalence, but rather  an implication  of the shift from an inflation  tax 
to regular  taxation.  " I was surprised,  though,  by the way this  impeccable 
reasoning  was applied  to the Israeli  experience  of the mid-  1980s.  Higher 
inflation in Israel did lead to reductions in real tax collections and 
apparently  also to increases in real government  spending.4  However, 
my understanding  is that variations  in the real revenue from printing 
money were unimportant.  That is, variations  in the measured public 
saving rate in Israel mainly represented  changes in the rate of flow of 
real public debt (in the form of indexed obligations).  Thus, the Israeli 
experience represents the type of intertemporal  rearrangement  of the 
timing  of taxes that comes up in discussions of Ricardian  equivalence. 
The authors could argue with my interpretation  of the results of that 
experiment  but not, I think,  about  the existence of the experiment. 
Much of the paper's analysis deals with the stability  of inflation  in a 
context of budget-driven  endogenous money and the link between 
inflation  and  the  quantity  of real  tax  receipts.  Disturbances  to government 
expenditures  or  to the  real  economy  change  the  incentives  for  inflationary 
finance  and  thereby  affect  the dynamics  of inflation.  The  argument  states 
that, because of endogenous money, even small shocks can drive the 
economy toward  hyperinflation.  This result seems to prove too much; 
3. This result is consistent with the arguments  about  inflationary  finance  in Sargent 
and  Wallace  (1981). 
4.  My understanding  of this effect, derived  from  a discussion  with Michael  Bruno,  is 
that  government  departments  were allocated  a budget  in nominal  terms  to cover spending 
over some future  period. The amount  of the allotment  took account of the anticipated 
inflation  over  the period,  an adjustment  that  would  be reasonable  if the revenues  were  held 
in Israeli  currency  until  spent. Since  the funds  were actually  held  in indexed  form,  the real 
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after all, hyperinflation  is an unusual  event. From 1970  to 1985  only 14 
of 118  countries  had annual  inflation  rates that averaged  more than 20 
percent  and only 7 exceeded 40 percent  average  annual  inflation.  From 
1960  to 1970  the corresponding  numbers  were, respectively, 5 and 1 out 
of 115  countries. 
One element of the dynamics relates to the Bruno-Fischer  type of 
story of unstable  inflation.5  In the steady state, there are two inflation 
rates that  correspond  to a given real revenue  from  money creation,  one 
on either side of the peak in the Laffer  curve. (This setup assumes that 
the required  steady-state  revenue is less than the maximum  possible.) 
Under some specifications  of inflationary  expectations and price flexi- 
bility, the lower inflation  rate  is found  to be unstable  and  the higher  rate 
is found to be stable.6  Thus, if the economy begins at the low rate, a 
shock to government  spending  could initiate a dynamic  path that con- 
verges to the high  inflation  rate. 
Consider  the example  of a beer tax. A given (feasible)  amount  of real 
revenue  can be obtained  with  a low tax rate  or a high  tax rate. Normally, 
we would regard  the high  tax rate  on the wrong side of the Laffer  curve 
as irrelevant.  The implicit assumptions  are that the government  likes 
revenue, the distortion is increasing in the tax rate on beer, and the 
government  dislikes distortion  for its own sake. (I neglect here negative 
externalities  associated  with  the consumption  of beer.)  The high  tax rate 
is irrelevant  in this setting because the optimizing  government  would 
select the low tax rate. 
The question is why the results are different  with the inflation  tax. 
The main difference has, I think, little to do with the rationality  or 
irrationality  of inflationary  expectations,  but  does depend  on the govern- 
ment's ability  to generate  revenue  by causing  surprise  inflation;  that is, 
5. Bruno  and  Fischer  (1990). 
6. The instability  under  rational  expectations,  familiar  from  the Cagan  (1956)  model, 
derives  from  a restriction  on the  flexibility  of the initial  price  level; see Sargent  and  Wallace 
(1973b).  Suppose  that  the  demand  for  a durable  good, Yd,  depends  negatively  on the  current 
price, P,  and positively  on the (expected  and actual)  future  price, P,  +.  (For money, the 
price corresponds  to the inverse of the general price level.) The analog to the Cagan 
demand  function  is Yd  = (I/P,) exp[otlog(P,,  II',)]. Assume  an exogenous  path  of supply, 
such as Y, =  Y, and market  clearing, Yd  =  Ys,  in all periods. The Cagan  exercise is to 
consider  the path of P, for a given arbitrary  P,. The instability  of P, under  the Cagan 
demand  function  can be shown  readily,  but the result  depends  on the assumed  rigidity  of 
PO.  The key aspect of the Cagan  demand  function in generating  this result is that the 
sensitivity  of Yd  to log (P,) is greater  in magnitude  than that to log(P,+  ). Therefore,  an 
"error"  in log(PO)  is magnified  for log(P,), further  magnified  for log(P2),  and  so on. 74  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
by imposing  a capital  levy on holders  of nominally  denominated  govern- 
ment liabilities.  Furthermore,  the government  is assumed to be unable 
to commit  itself at the outset to resisting  these capital  levies ex post.7  If 
commitments  cannot be supported  by formal rules or reputation,  the 
low inflation  rate  is time-inconsistent  and  is not an equilibrium.8  The  high 
inflation  rate  is, however, also not an  equilibrium  in this case. Moreover, 
the type of dynamics  analyzed by Michael Bruno  and Stanley Fischer 
does not arise.9  In contrast, if commitments  are feasible, then only the 
low inflation  rate  is an equilibrium,  as in the case of a beer tax. Thus, in 
either case, these arguments  about government  revenue from inflation 
do not have clear  implications  for the stability  and  dynamics  of inflation. 
The discussion does suggest that commitment  and credibility are 
important  for the stability  of inflation  and for reforms  aimed at ending 
inflation.  Although  these concepts are difficult  to measure  and hard  to 
translate  into policy advice, one implication  is that it is unwise to begin 
a stabilization  program  by defaulting  on past debt  obligations;  that  is, by 
breaking  a past commitment.  (Alexander  Hamilton  would surely  frown 
on this sort of default.) 
Other  parts of the dynamic  story in this paper  involve lags in price- 
wage adjustment  and alterations  in the frequency  of wage payments. I 
could not see how discrete intervals  between adjustments  of prices or 
wages would  generate  a systematic  lag of wages or of the prices of some 
items  behind  the general  price  level. Aside from  the fixity  of the average 
relative  price at unity, optimal  behavior  with fixed costs of adjustment 
entails sufficient overshooting at the outset so that the average gap 
between the actual  and  target  wage or price  is zero. The authors  may be 
saying  that  empirically  a higher  inflation  rate  leads for a while to a lower 
real wage rate. But this observation is hard to interpret  because an 
increase in the inflation rate is,  as  suggested before, likely to  be 
symptomatic  of an adverse real  disturbance  that affects the equilibrium 
real  wage rate. 
In the discussion  of the frequency  of payment,  I was unsure  about  the 
nature  of the equilibrium  envisioned  for the labor  market.  Suppose  that 
workers get paid the real amount (w/P) T at interval T. I assume that 
7. These  issue may  also arise  for a beer  tax if consumers  get addicted  to beer  over  time 
and if the government  cannot commit  itself to abstain  from high tax rates in the future. 
Perhaps  this time-consistency  argument  explains the high (equilibrium)  tax rates on 
addictive  goods, such  as cigarettes,  alcohol,  and  gambling. 
8. See Calvo  (1978)  and  Barro  (1983). 
9.  Bruno  and  Fischer  (1990). Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Federico Sturzenegger,  and Holger Wolf  75 
workers  like a higher  real wage, wIP, and in the relevant  range  a lower 
T. Competitive  firms then face an upward-sloping  trade-off between 
wIP and T and can choose an optimal package based on their own 
discount  rate  and  the costs of making  payments.  The argument  also goes 
through  if firms have monopsony power in the labor market. Labor 
supply depends on the (wIP,  I)  package as evaluated by the workers; 
firms  with monopsony  power that face this labor supply  function  again 
internalize  the workers'  trade-off  between wIP  and T. 
Dornbusch,  Sturzenegger,  and Wolf suggest that  firms  like to keep T 
high  in an inflation  because they not only make  payments  less often but 
also reduce  the value of wIP  because of the lag of nominal  wages behind 
inflation.  I do not know what kind of equilibrium  this represents,  but it 
surely does not derive from monopsony power of firms in the labor 
market. Perhaps  it arises because the government  regulates apparent 
wage rates and the maintenance  of a high  value of T  reduces  the overall 
wage package toward the equilibrium  value that would obtain in the 
absence of government  intervention. This result parallels private re- 
sponses to price controls in the form of reduced product quality and 
increased  delivery  lags. 
Overall, the paper has many interesting theoretical and empirical 
insights  about  inflation.  What  is lacking,  however, is the combination  of 
the ideas into a clear bottom line. This shortcoming  is, however, not 
surprising  considering  that  the central  challenge  the paper  sets for itself 
is an empirical  explanation  for the variation  in inflation  over time and 
across countries. This task, which goes well beyond the possible fact 
that  "inflation  is always  and  everywhere  a monetary  phenomenon,"  has 
not yet been satisfactorily  undertaken. 
General Discussion 
Jeffrey  Sachs emphasized  that  one had  to know the economic history 
of and political  climate in a country in order to evaluate the particular 
policy choices considered by the authors-such  as whether to use 
incomes policy or whether  to have fixed or flexible exchange rates. In 
countries such as Poland, where reducing government control and 
liberalizing  the economy are central  policy objectives, extensive price 
controls  would conflict with these larger  goals. In Argentina,  because 
the new Menem  government  had been expected to institute  wage-price 
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his inauguration,  causing inflation problems that might never have 
occurred otherwise. By contrast, at the onsets of the Austral plan in 
Argentina  and the stabilization  program  in Israel, wage-price  controls 
were unexpected  and probably  helped stabilize  with little distortionary 
effect. 
Sachs reasoned  that  incomes policies were most likely to be useful  in 
countries  with extensive indexing  and centralized  wage-setting  institu- 
tions, particularly  in cases where a national  union  or a union  movement 
allied with the government  was involved. In socialist countries, wage 
controls  were needed  because there  are no real  owners  of the firms.  But 
in other situations,  these conditions  were not present. Not only would 
incomes policy be unlikely to help, but relying on it might divert the 
government  from  taking  needed  policy steps such  as fiscal  and  monetary 
tightening  and market  reform. 
The model's emphasis on the interaction  of the deficit and inflation 
led Olivier  Blanchard  to question  whether  the nature  of the initial  shock 
might  deserve more study. If, for example, the inflation  was started  by 
a conflict  over  income  distribution,  then  stabilization  would  be especially 
difficult  and might  require  a contraction  to resolve the diverse  claims  on 
national  income. Absent  a contraction,  such  a shock  might  persist.  Other 
types of shocks might  be transitory,  permitting  a quicker  and  less costly 
end to the inflation  that  they cause. 
In light  of anecdotal  evidence and  theory  predicting  that  people would 
go to great lengths to reduce their holding  of money during  hyperinfla- 
tions, David  Romer  expected that  real  money stocks would  fall by larger 
orders of magnitude  than shown in the paper's figures. Rudiger  Dorn- 
busch  explained  that  the flight  from  money  became  intense  once inflation 
reached, say, 100  percent a year, and well before it reached  the hyper- 
inflation  stage. Thus the economizing on money holding had already 
taken  place before  the start  of some figures  in the paper. 
Sachs agreed that dollarization  could, in principle, be an effective 
way to stabilize inflation.  But he noted that dollarization  also carried 
potentially  high costs: not only a loss of seigniorage  but also a loss of 
control over the banking  system. He observed that Panama  could not 
remonetize  its banking  system after  the United States froze deposits of 
Panamanian  banks.  The Panamanian  experience  also demonstrated  how 
vulnerable a country could become to  U.S.  interference once that 
country  has dollarized. Rudiger Dornbusch,  Federico  Sturzenegger,  and Holger  Wolf  77 
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